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What kind of Southeast Asia are we going to see 10 to 20 years from now on? I want to take this opportunity to talk 
about the coming challenges rather than the current problems 
we face. Future issues will be shared ones that need to be dealt 
with not just by Japan, but collectively with other Southeast Asian 
countries. In this article I want to focus on how political and eco-
nomical changes are reconfiguring geo-political relations in the 
region and reflect upon the combined future role of Japan and 
ASEAN. 
There is no doubt that there are presently momentous chang-
es taking place in East Asia. If we look back at the history of the 
area including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the 
ten ASEAN countries, this area started to be called East Asia to-
wards the end of the 1980s. The region assumed its current iden-
tity in the wake of the Plaza accord in 1985. At that time, the 1985 
exchange rate of the dollar was $1 to 260-270 yen and after the 
accord the yen appreciated drastically to 110-120. This enormous 
appreciation drove Japanese firms abroad to do business and 
set up production facilities in industrial centres such as Bangkok, 
some of the major cities of Malaysia, some areas of Cebu and 
Manila in the Philippines, as well as Indonesia and so on. 
As a result of this, by the end of the 1980s, discussion on the 
idea of integration in region arose, with people starting to see 
the region as meaningful. It was at this time that at the end of 
the 80s, Dr Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia called for the crea-
tion of East Asia economic grouping, but this call was, shot down 
by the Americans, Australians and Japanese. This did not put 
off people realizing that there was an awareness of some kind 
of vision of East Asia being created. In part, as a counter move 
to Dr Mahathir’s initiative to call for an economic grouping, Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was formed in 1989 at the 
suggestion of the Japanese and Australian government and over 
the following 10 years, APEC served as the cooperative regional 
framework. Yet, we should not forget that during this period, spe-
cifically in 1997, a crisis engulfed the region, hitting Thailand first, 
then Indonesia, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries. 
This Asian crisis marked a major turning point in the history 
of this region as many countries became acutely aware of the 
dangers of globalizing financial capital. Many countries suffered 
heavy-handed American intervention at that time. As such the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a collective mechanism to establish 
a zone of currency stability, was initiated in the year 2000 in re-
sponse to global finance capitalism. The ASEAN +3 summit which 
had first been held in 1997 became regularized in 1998. The East 
Asian Summit (EAS) and ASEAN +6 also started in 2005. What we 
can say here is that the ‘97-‘98 crisis crucially marked the creation 
of a regional architecture with ASEAN as a hub. 
However, the last two years have also seen some interesting 
developments as a result of the Lehman shock. We can now see 
that the pendulum has swung back from East Asia to Asian Pa-
cific. For example ASEAN +6 has now expanded to become ASEAN 
+8 to include Russia and the United States. Transpacific partner-
ships have started to emerge this year as a major pathway to the 
creation of free trade and investment areas even though some of 
ASEAN countries are divided among themselves. Some are keen 
to ratify the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (TPP) while others are still mulling over whether to join 
or not. Furthermore we can also observe the emergence of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Senior Official 
Ministers Meetings (ADSOM). These are major fora for discussing 
issues and clearly show a swing in the pendulum. But, what is 
clear here is that this swing does not occur without the impe-
tus of the major financial crisis that occurred in the world global 
economy as well as China’s new assertiveness especially in the 
Eastern and Southern Chinese seas over the past two years. In 
this sense, we must keep this historical context in mind when we 
try to think ahead and gauge the coming relationship between 
Japan and ASEAN nations over the next 10 years. 
To make the above clearer, I want to introduce two sets of 
data (see tables 1 & 2). The first shows the urban population in 
East Asia with data taken from the World Bank Report published 
in 2007. We can see that East Asia does not include figures from 
Japan (this is not my omission but the World Bank’s). However we 
can see that the ratio of urban population to the total population 
stands will reach 62% by 2030.  In the case of China 61% of the 
population will be urbanized, with 68% in Indonesia’s case, 76% 
in the Philippines, 43% in Vietnam, 86% in South Korea and so 
on. Considering the data, all cases highlight several interesting 
points. Firstly, depending on the composition of the urban-rural 
population there are three patterns we can identify. The Philip-
pines, South Korea and Malaysia will become mainly urbanized: 
like a large version of Singapore. For these countries the type of 
politics that will dominate will be urban politics. Secondly, China 
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 Increase (%) Total P. Urbanization
2000 2030 2030
China 456.5 877.6 90 1438.6 61
Indonesia 88.9 188 111 276.3 68
Philippines 44.3 86.6 96 113.9 76
Vietnam 19 46 142 106.9 43
S. Korea 37.3 43.1 16 50.2 86
Thailand 18.9 35.4 87 75.4 47
Malaysia 14.2 27.3 92 35 78
Cambodia 2.2 8.7 291 23.5 37
Laos 1 3.5 248 9.3 38
EA Total 803.2 1468.8 83 2369 62




and Indonesia will continue to rapidly urbanize. However, one 
third of the population—a large number, considering the total 
population—will remain rural. In these countries politics will 
revolve around not only urban politics but also crucially around 
urban-rural politics. 
Thirdly, mainland countries such as Thailand, Myanmar, Cam-
bodia and Laos will urbanize but the rural-urban gap, as well as 
the gap between urban middle classes and the urban poor, will 
play a defining role in their political landscapes. 
What this tells us is that with the exception of a few nations 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, most of 
these countries will not be predominantly middle class even 
though their numbers will grow over the coming years. An in-
come gap between the middle classes and the urban poor will 
persist. This is going to be a major issue that will remain with us 
for the next 20 years. This raises the next question that needs 
answering: how do ASEAN nations go about reducing this gap be-
tween the urban middle classes and rural/urban poor? Here, it 
seems that the only solution is economic growth, creating growth 
and reducing poverty. What is necessary is a kind of politics that 
can deliver economic development and create jobs. As a corollary 
of these politics, most countries need to be able to improve their 
investment climates and also train human resources so that they 
can deliver better economic growth. 
One thing we need to consider is that despite all these ef-
forts, economies grow unevenly. Let’s consider some hypotheti-
cal situations: Metropolitan Bangkok growing faster than rural 
Thailand, with the Thai economy growing faster than Myanmar 
or Cambodia’s. This kind of situation could entail people from 
these countries emigrating to Thailand, which would see not only 
the persistence of a dichotomy between the urban middle class 
and the poor, but also the introduction of foreign labor into the 
equation, and the problems that accompany cross-border migra-
tion such as human trafficking, mafia, money laundering, and 
other transnational crimes. Therefore, as important as economic 
growth is, we must also bear in mind the flip side, the dark side, 
of economic development. In order for us to have a better future 
together, we need to seriously consider the negative aspects of 
global capitalism. 
The second table presents data on long-term global economic 
forecasts first published in 2007. This table shows the year 2000s 
purchasing parity of the American dollar. The estimates have 
been reduced with Japan as the unit of comparison to gauge how 
big Japan will be in relation to other nations. What this compara-
tive table shows is that China’s economy will be 5 times that of 
Japan’s in 2030;  South Korea’s will be about 40% of the Japanese 
economy; India 2 times larger; ASEAN combined larger than Ja-
pan; the American economy 4.5 times larger and the EU 3.5 times 
larger. We do not need to ask if these statistics will become reality 
as past forecasts have often come to nothing. What is most likely 
is that 20 years from now, China will be twice as large as Japan’s 
and ASEAN countries combined may be as large as Japan’s. This 
means that the regional and global distribution of wealth and 
power are going to radically change. And as certainly predicted, 
the growth of India and China is going to vastly reconfigure the 
political and economic landscape of this region. The implication 
for Japan is clear. 20 years ago we can say that Japan was seen as 
Gulliver in Lilliput with 90% of investment in the region. But, 20 
years from now, Japan will only be as big as ASEAN combined. Ja-
pan will no longer be a Gulliver, but a reduced player in the field. 
This raises a crucial question: what does Japan need to do? When 
distribution of wealth and power radically changes the possibility 
of a break in the international order can occur but it is important 
that this kind of change does not happen in a revolutionary kind 
of way as it would not be in anyone’s interests. However, prepara-
tions and contingencies must be taken in order to face up to the 
fact that international orders do undergo change. The point to 
keep in mind is to make sure that change is evolutionary and does 
not negatively or adversely affect any country or group of people. 
     Combining these two forecasts allows us to understand what 
kinds of ideas inform Japan’s long-term policy. On the one hand, 
whatever the party affiliation of the politician (whether Liberal 
Democratic Party or Democratic Progressive Party), people in Ja-
pan are greatly aware that it will not continue to be the major 
power in the region. 30 years ago, Japanese talked about Japan 
being a super-power in the region. There was even an article en-
titled ‘After Hegemony’  in which people tried to imagine who will 
take over the hegemonic role of America after its decline in the re-
gion.1 Yet now, thinking is shifting to the challenge of ensuring the 
prosperity and stability in the region. Here, ASEAN is crucial for 
Japan’s foreign policy thinking. Firstly, if you look at Japan’s busi-
ness strategies, market matters as Japanese firms provide a lot of 
power to the Japanese government itself. In that sense, if we look 
at Japanese businesses it is clear that they have been pursuing 
a China +1 investment policy investment. That is, they invest in 
China, but do not place all their eggs in one basket. Instead, they 
also place some of their eggs in one other country, usually some-
where in Southeast Asia. Firstly, given that these economies are 
growing, many businesses now see ASEAN countries as a launch-
ing pad to make investment in India. Thus, ASEAN now plays a 
crucial role for Japanese business. Secondly, as I am serving as 
the executive member for the council of Science and Technology 
Policy, let me explain what initiative the Japanese government 
has been taking in this area. Earlier in 2010, the Japanese govern-
ment under the then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, came up 
with a set of policies to promote East Asia community building. 
One area that was very much emphasized was the East Asian
Science and Innovation on Area, proposed by the Japanese gov-
Country/region 2020 2030 2040
GDP
Japan 1 1 1
China 4.1 5.3 6.1
S. Korea 0.4 0.4 0.4
India 1.7 2.2 2.9
ASEAN 0.9 1.2 1.5
US 4 4.5 5.4
EU 3.4 3.5 3.6
Table 2 Long-term Global Economic Forecast
Figures from Japan Economic Research Center, 2007
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ernment at the fifth EAS summit in Vietnam which may be approved 
by next year. What I want to make clear here is that we are now fac-
ing a series of challenges, including climate change, energy issues, 
disaster prevention, management and mitigation. To address these 
issues, it will be useful for all nations to work together in confront-
ing them. Japan will establish research facilities to deal with these 
issues in ASEAN countries. Also, given the fact that ASEAN will play 
such an important role in Japan’s future the development of human 
resources is also of the utmostimportance, especially in the training 
of scientists and engineers and so forth. This initiative will need to 
look at how human resource development can be fostered. Japan 
can no longer be thesole provider of funds, but now needs to work 
in partnership with other ASEAN + 8 nations towards scientific in-
novation to overcome common challenges. Thirdly, in the realm of 
security, I served as deputy chair on Japan’s security and defence 
panel in providing input on Japan’s new defence policy approved 
in late 2010. Japan has called for not only the strengthening of the 
Japan-U.S. alliance system in the region, but also strategic partner-
ships with other nations such as South Korea and Australia, as well 
as ASEAN partners if they are willing to strengthen them. Securing 
the sea lanes from Japan to the Middle East is especially important. 
We are keen to develop partnerships with South Korea, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Vietnam as well as other nations. On a final note, it 
is important to create norms and codes of common conduct in the 
region. In community-building especially in East Asia, we need to 
agree on common norms and code of conduct, not only in the realm 
of security, but also in other realms such as ODA, trade, investment 
and so on. In all these areas, ASEAN is crucial, not hopes that it can 
work closely together with ASEAN to achieve the common good in 
the region.
1. 村上泰亮「あふたあ,へげもにい一日米経済摩擦への対応策」
『中央公論』 1985 年 11 月号 Murakami, Yasusuke. “After Hegemony: 
How to Deal with Japan US Trade Conflicts,” in Chuokoron, Nov. 1985.
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Southeast Asia in the History of the East 
Asian Miracle Sugihara Kaoru 
Professor CSEAS
The East Asian miracle in global history
Accounting for the “East Asian miracle” has become an im-portant global history question. Ten Asian countries (Ja-
pan, NIEs, 4 ASEAN countries and China) increased their share 
in world GDP from 10 per cent in 1950 to more than 30 per cent 
by the early 2000s. This regional surge has inevitably changed 
the course of global history at least in two fundamental ways.
First, the perception of global inequality has changed. In 1950 a 
small number of rich countries in the West were contrasted with a 
vast number of poor ones in the rest of the world. The technologi-
cal and institutional superiority of the West took effect with the 
industrial revolution in England and the diffusion of industrializa-
tion in Western Europe and the United States. The expansion of 
the West also resulted in the acquisition and de facto monopoly of 
vast natural resources, especially in the New World, by a relative-
ly small number of the population. Thus the divide between the 
high-wage Atlantic economy and the low-wage economies in the 
rest of the world was clearly drawn. Even Japan, the first industrial 
nation in the non-Western world, remained a relatively low-wage 
country, compared to the participants of the Atlantic economy. 
By contrast, in discussing poverty today we focus on what Paul 
Collier calls the “bottom billion”, those  who live mainly in Africa 
and South Asia, as against the majority of the world’s population. 
The ten Asian countries now belong to either developed (high in-
come) or emerging (middle income) economies. And many others 
followed, making the middle income category ever larger. Thus, 
while the bottom billion firmly reminds us of the unsolved issues 
of poverty and inequality, the long-term tendency towards global 
inequality has been arrested, if not reversed. This is a “miracle of 
distribution”, whose significance is arguably comparable to the 
“miracle of production” which begun in England two centuries ago. 
Second, the pattern of international division of labour has radi-
cally changed. In 1950 the majority of manufacturing industries 
were located in the West, while the rest of the world was typi-
cally integrated into the world economy as exporters of primary 
products. Meiji Japan proceeded with labour-intensive industri-
alization, which was followed by interwar China, but most of the 
non-European world was under colonial rule, and the systematic 
policy for industrial development was absent. It was after 1945 
that counties in Asia and Africa achieved independence and began 
industrialization, by taking advantage of the availability of com-
petitive labour. In particular, the successful transformation of East 
Asia into the “factory of the world” meant the emergence of a new 
pattern of international division of labour. In contrast to the previ-
ous system where a small number of Western countries exported 
manufactured goods to the rest of the world, while the latter 
exported primary products to the former, East Asia began to ex
port labour-intensive manufactured goods to the West, while 
importing capital-intensive manufactured goods (as well as 
primary products) from there. Furthermore, both regions im-
ported primary products from other parts of the world. Thus 
a three-tier division of labour emerged where advanced West-
ern countries specialized in capital-intensive industries (and fi-
nance), East Asia in labour- (and human resource-) intensive 
industries, and other developing countries in resources and pri-
mary products. While the distinction between labour-intensive 
and capital-intensive industries has become blurred in recent 
years, as Japan and NIEs moved to high-wage economies, the 
region as a whole remains distinctively labour-intensive, sus-
taining the majority of the world’s manufacturing employment. 
And the labour-intensive path of industrialization has been fol-
lowed vigorously by other regions, especially in South Asia.
Transformation of Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia as a region experienced perhaps the fastest struc-
tural transformation in global history from the export economies 
of primary products to industrialized countries. In 1950, four 
countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and 
Thailand; hereafter ASEAN 4) and Singapore (territorial changes 
were adjusted wherever possible) were all exporters of prima-
ry products par excellence. By the end of the twentieth century 
they became exporters of labour-intensive manufactured goods 
and importers of capital-intensive manufactured goods. Follow-
ing the lead of South Korea and Taiwan, a rapid shift took place in 
the 1970s and the 1980s. Figure 1 and 2 suggests a fundamental 
change in the five countries’ position in the international economy. 
The shares of manufacturing output and employment to their GDP 
show essentially the same trend, with time lags and variations. 
The transformation from an agricultural to an industrial econo-
my, which began in Western countries and Japan in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, usually took much longer and it was 
interwar depression that slowed the process of industrialization 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yet, even with the restoration 
of free trade and an expansion of the world economy after the 
Second World War, other developing regions, mostly with colonial 
heritages, found it difficult to achieve import substitution industri-
alization for a number of reasons; a stable polity and a competent 
bureaucracy had to be created; the physical infrastructure such 
as railways and ports were built primarily for exports of primary 
products rather than for local production and trade; the tasks of 
controlling epidemics and ecological disasters, and securing water 
and energy for  local communities in the tropical or semi-tropical 
zones, were largely unfinished and remained a major challenge; 
there was little investment in primary and secondary education, 
and skilled and educated labour was not readily available; and 
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in the 1950s the terms of trade were not favourable for prima-
ry producers. However, above all, the predominant ideology of 
the early post-war period, import substitution industrialization, 
aimed at a comprehensive form of industrialization as a symbol of 
national autonomy, which was largely a reaction to colonialism and 
worked against full economic contacts with advanced countries. 
There are at least three reasons why Southeast Asia man-
aged to transform itself so quickly. First, the region successively 
found the market for their products in the post-war period rela-
tively smoothly, by first exporting primary products to the ex-
panding American market, then by participating in the com-
modity chain of labour-intensive manufactured goods initiated 
by Japanese, American and other foreign companies, and finally 
exporting competitive labour-intensive manufactured goods 
by themselves (or in corporation with multinational compa-
nies). After the second half of the 1960s, it was able to benefit 
from foreign investment and, through it, the transfer of techno-
logical and managerial knowledge for industrial development. 
Although the region suffered many wars and conflicts, and many 
other Southeast Asian countries were left out of this dynamics 
of economic linkages for a long time, ASEAN slowly expanded 
its membership and steadily increased its economic influences.
Second, against the background of population growth, there 
was a growth of labour-intensive industries, which absorbed la-
bour. In 1974, Indonesia for example, had manufacturing employ-
ment of around four million, mostly in very small establishments 
in rural areas engaging in food processing and other traditional 
industries. This was too big a sector for the capital-intensive man-
ufacturing sector to absorb. In 1970, Harry Oshima argued for a 
systematic effort to make these small industries internationally 
competitive, with a fuller and the more efficient use of labour, 
training of skilled labour, better marketing and more detailed gov-
ernment support for information gathering and export promotion. 
This was a strategy close to the East Asian (especially Japanese) 
path, signalling a clear departure from the heavy industry orienta-
tion the earlier orthodoxy had advocated. On the one hand, la-
bour, both rural and urban, was absorbed into sweat shops and 
modern factories as unskilled labour, with low wages and terrible 
working conditions. It was under such conditions that society be-
came unequal in many ways. At the same time, there was social 
mobility, the increasing availability of a large numbers of primary 
and secondary school graduates with better health which led to 
an improvement in the quality of the workforce.  This was a ma-
jor reason why the pace of industrialization of ASEAN 4 acceler-
ated by the 1980s, overtaking early industrializers such as India. 
Third, it was on this basis that export-oriented industrializa-
tion strategy diffused rapidly. In many respects the strategy looked 
“shallow”; It was externally induced (often with export process-
ing zones and other government measures to promote invest-
ment of multinational companies); the sequential upgrading of 
an industrial structure, typically seen in earlier industrializations 
from light industry to heavy industry with all “basic” industries 
and complicated linkages, was missing; land reform was incom-
plete, and rural inequality remained a macroeconomic issue. But 
it was not a shallow kind of industrialization, in the sense that it 
was supported by competitive labour (cheap labour able to pro-
duce goods in a competitive market). It was natural that NIEs 
and ASEAN 4 countries with smaller populations, were keener on 
export-orientation than the United States or Japan (both with a 
low ratio of trade to GDP). The growth of a relatively homogenous 
market for cheap, labour-intensive manufactured goods across 
East and Southeast Asia made regional industrialization possible
The core ideology behind this process was “developmental-
ism”, which was created to pool all the resources for economic 
development. It advocated both regional and international eco-
nomic cooperation through trade, capital flows and technological 
transfer in strong terms. Part of this idea came from Japan and dif-
fused to NIEs to ASEAN countries, and, helped by Australians, took 
the form of “open regionalism”. It argued for a free trade within 
the region, but without discriminating against outsiders. South-
east Asia played a key role in the diffusion of this principle. And 
its economic success, linking intra-Asian dynamism to world trade, 
would eventually persuade China and India to join forces. Develop-
mentalism was distinct from both the principle of unfettered free 
trade without national and regional considerations, and socialism 
with emphasis on planning and autonomy. Although its practice 
suffered from authoritarian rule and the Cold War divide, it was 
committed to raising living standards for the ordinary people, and 
survived the criticisms of liberal democracy and “market funda-
mentalism”. Developmentalism was not only the guiding princi-
ple of the “East Asian miracle”; it largely created a regional order. 
Beyond Developmentalism
Throughout the process of structural transformation in South-
east Asia, deforestation and other environmental degrada-
tion induced by industrialization and globalization have been 
a serious concern for both local communities and environ-
mentalists. More recently, deforestation also attracted atten-
tion in the context of climate change. Yet these concerns have 
not featured largely in the discourse of developmentalism. 
Did Southeast Asia figure badly in comparison to the histori-
cal experiences of other regions in these respects? In contrast to 
advanced Western countries, which used coal for household use 
from early on, ASEAN 4 used a lot of biomass energy for non-com-
mercial use during the process of industrialization, in addition to 
exporting forest and plantation products. These resources were 
used, often without concerns for environmental sustainability. 
Meanwhile, the use of commercial energy (coal, oil, natural gas 
and electricity) has progressively become more efficient. The ener-
gy efficiency (measured in terms of commercial energy consump-
tion divided by GDP) of ASEAN 4 has now become quite respect-
able. A combination of these, however, was insufficient to cater for 
the rapid growth of energy demand, and Southeast Asia’s imports 
of oil from outside the region steadily rose. In energy and resource 
use terms, the region is becoming less and less self-sufficient.
As such, in none of these respects does Southeast Asia’s per-
formance look particularly extraordinary, when the rapid pace 
of transformation is taken into account. Yet, what is unique is 
that, after that happened, the region is still endowed with re-
markably rich biomass and unparalleled bio-diversity. Whether 
or not we can establish the notion that environmental sustain-
ability must be the basis of economic development is a big 
question. An answer to this question will determine the fu-
ture of the region, as well as the shape of human development. 
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Cambodia John Clifford Holt
Visiting Research Fellow CSEAS 
In the study of religion undertaken from the perspective of the human sciences, Max Weber’s classic essay, The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, has proved to be an enduring 
theoretical influence. Not only did Weber’s insightful analysis 
reveal how assent to cardinal doctrinal beliefs has generated a 
significant effect upon social and economic behavior histori-
cally, especially in European and American contexts, but it also 
stimulated subsequent studies by social scientists such as Robert 
Bellah and S.J. Tambiah, scholars who attempted to find a corol-
lary relationship between religious thought and social behavior 
in the predominantly Buddhist cultures of Japan and Southeast 
Asia respectively.  Bellah’s Tokugawa Religion, published 40 years 
ago, remains a standard example of how Weber’s theoretical 
approach, highlighting the socio-economic consequences of re-
ligious dispositions, is relevant beyond Western/Christian con-
texts.  Tambiah’s studies helped us to understand how concern 
for karmic consequences in Theravada cultures has generated 
rational economic activity.
While the Weberian approach to understanding the relation-
ship between religion and society has proved very insightful, it 
has also tended to privilege the importance of abstract ideas or 
beliefs at the expense of ritual and ethical practice.  Within thor-
oughgoing Weberian approaches to the study of religion, ritual 
and ethics have sometimes been treated as if they are the silent 
cousins of myth and philosophy, and are sometimes eclipsed in 
the analysis of expressive religious culture.  However,  if the re-
lationship between thought and practice, and the relationship 
between religion and society, are understood as fundamentally 
reflexive in nature, and if we are cognizant not only about how 
religious ideas affect behavior, but also about how forces of social 
change, especially within the context of political economy, affect 
the nature of religion, then we gain an enriched and more nu-
anced understanding of the dynamics of religious culture.  
For instance, in studying the origins and spread of Buddhism 
in the ancient Indian world, we should be aware of not only the 
substance of the new philosophical perspectives that Gautama 
advanced in his more doctrinally oriented teachings preserved in 
the Pali Suttapitaka, but also of the fact that historically socio-
economic processes of urbanization and trade were creating new 
existential conditions, and new social classes of people who were 
confronted with new social and psychological problems to solve. 
The spread of Buddhism can be understood as a consequence 
of a new religious consciousness that appealed to a new set of 
people who were experiencing new types of problems.   That is, 
Buddhist thought evolved, in part, in response to changing social, 
economic and political conditions.  
It is precisely this theoretical perspective, one that observes 
the reflexive relationship between religion and society, and 
thought and practice, that governs my current research.  The ba-
sic maxim I am working with is this:  historical changes in types 
of social experience foster changes in religious culture and fur-
ther, that religious culture itself becomes a medium for articu-
lating social change, which is often conveyed through ritual per-
formances.   Thus, while ritual is often regarded as a means by 
which religious traditions are reified or preserved, it can also be 
a means for the expression of significant changes that have oc-
curred within society.
I am attempting to illuminate this continuing reflexive proc-
ess between religion and society through a comparative study 
of ritual in the Theravada Buddhist traditions of contemporary 
Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.  I remain concerned with religious 
ideas, but I am now also focused on how and why certain rites 
gain and sustain popularity and relevance. The book I am cur-
rently writing contains chapters about how social, economic and 
political changes have resulted in the increased popularity of cer-
tain rites in Sri Lanka [the annual asala perahara ritual procession 
of the dalada or “tooth-relic” of the Buddha that takes place in 
Kandy, Sri Lanka], Laos [the annual pi mai ritual ablutions of the 
phrabang image of the Buddha, the palladium of traditional Lao 
polity], and Thailand [the merit-making occasion that consists of 
the recitation of the Vessantara Jataka]. 
I am writing two other chapters of the book while in residence 
at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies.  One chapter focuses 
upon the annual fifteen-day ritual of pchum ben that is celebrat-
ed in Cambodia each September/October.  The ostensible pur-
pose of pchum ben is to assuage the sufferings of deceased fam-
ily relations.   The second chapter focuses upon the ancient and 
still enduring robe-giving ceremony known as kathina that is held 
every year in Myanmar [Burma] each October/November during 
which time Buddhist laymen and laywomen make merit through 
their material contributions of support to the monastic sangha. 
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In what remains of this brief article, I will write only about the 
contemporary Khmer practice of pchum ben in Cambodia.
In contemporary Cambodia, many monks will say in their 
dhamma talks to the laity that pchum ben, the current practice of 
assisting familial dead through merit transfer and the ritual feed-
ing of rice at Buddhist temples over the fifteen da “season,” is 
historically a rather recent Khmer cultural, and not necessarily 
Buddhist phenomenon, that dates to the paradigmatic actions 
of the renown and pious Khmer Buddhist king Duang, a pivotal 
political figure who ruled from Udong just northwest of Phnom 
Penh in the mid-nineteenth century.  Duang is fondly remem-
bered in Khmer culture as a pre-colonial ruler who reinvigorated 
Buddhist and Khmer traditions.  Many orthodox-minded Buddhist 
monks support and participate in the performance of pchum ben 
rites, now widely regarded in Cambodia as the most important 
ritual season of the calendar year and an essential component 
of maintaining the economic health of most Buddhist vats [tem-
ples]. They also assert that these rites are more the product of 
Khmer custom rather than an essential Buddhist religious expres-
sion.  This is especially true of monks who promote a more philo-
sophically rational and modernist approach to Buddhist thought; 
for, to them, belief in the vitality, or reality, of spirits is a mat-
ter of outdated folk superstitions.  Despite these pious monas-
tic assertions, the ancient Buddhist roots of this contemporary 
practice are quite demonstrable:  they are very clearly reflected 
in an important Pali text entitled the Petavatthu, a collection of 
stories attributed to the Buddha that aim ostensibly to illustrate 
the efficacy of karmic retribution. The Petavatthu is a text that 
likely dates to the very early phases of Buddhist literary activity, 
probably in the last centuries of the 1st millennium BCE.  It is re-
ferred to in the Pali chronicle, the Mahavamsa, as the second text 
preached by the great Indian emperor Asoka’s monastic mission-
ary son, Mahinda, when he is said to have converted the Sinhala 
king Devanampiya Tissa and the masses of laity on his arrival in 
Sri Lanka.  These conversions, according to the Mahavamsa, led 
to a monumental moment in history:  the establishment of the 
Buddhist sangha in Lanka.  So begins the heritage of Buddhist his-
tory in Sri Lanka that is shared by all lineages of the Theravada in 
Southeast Asia, including the Khmer.
In each of the stories comprising the Petavatthu, a protagonist 
commits an immoral action generated by one of the unhealthy 
mental dispositions [asavas]: passion [raga], hatred [dosa] or de-
lusion [moha].  Consequently, s/he is reborn as a peta[male] or 
peti [female] [hungry ghost] in petaloka, one of the six realms 
of samsara in which karma from actions generated as a human 
being is played out. In this case it is in horrific forms of suffering 
physically mirroring the nature of transgressions that propelled 
them into this unfortunate rebirth.  Either the story ends here, 
with the lesson of karmic retribution graphically illustrated, or it 
continues with the peta appearing in a dream to a surviving kins-
men and making an emotional appeal for help (Fig. 1). Help is 
possible, so the petas aver to their family members, by making 
gifts of charity to the Buddha’s sangha and sharing the merit of 
those pious actions with the deceased.  In one particular Petavat-
thu story that is often referred to during current pchum ben cer-
emonies held at Phnom Penh vats, an ancient Indian king at the 
time of the Buddha, Bimbisara, initiated the practice of offering 
rice balls [pindas] for deceased kin to help assuage their suffering 
from hunger.  This is precisely what happens in the contemporary 
Cambodian cultic context where family members provide a ritual 
feeding of rice to the dead at as many as seven different temples 
in the early hours of pre-twilight mornings over a fifteen-day pe-
riod.  On each occasion, the rice balls are distributed during three 
circumambulations of the temple’s sermon hall.  Most Khmer 
Buddhists believe that Yama (Fig. 2), the king of the dead, allows 
suffering spirits this brief window of release to receive the bless-
ings for the benefit of their surviving family’s compassion (Fig. 3). 
Pchum ben has become, arguably, the most important ritual 
in the Khmer calendar year rivaled, perhaps, only by the April 
New Year’s celebrations.  At the time of this rite in September/
October, hundreds of thousands of people, generally from young-
er generations now living in the urban areas of the country, espe-
cially Phnom Penh, travel back to their rural village homes to the 
temples where their most recently deceased ancestors, usually 
father, mother, siblings, grandfather or grandmother, have been 
cremated.  There, a distribution of rice balls [pinda] at the home 
temple in the very early hours of the morning and the subsequent 
ritual chanting of suttas led by monks and sponsored by family 
members [bansukol] are performed as the penultimate culminat-
ing ceremony for the benefit of the dead on the final morning of 
the “season.”  Usually in the afternoon, the spirits of the dead are 
then ritually returned to their abode via a ceremonial boat (Fig. 4) 
that has been constructed especially for this occasion.  Pchum 
ben has become not only an important expression of familial re-
ligion, of ancestor veneration, but it also is a veritable contempo-
rary form of pilgrimage.  What has caused its spectacular rise in 
popularity in recent years?  
While the world is now very well aware of the terrible suf-
fering that was inflicted on Cambodians during the 3 years, 8 
months, and 20 days of Khmer Rouge political hegemony, it is still 
difficult to convey to outsiders the intense degrees of impact that 
this collective experience of death and terror has made upon the 
Cambodian people and their culture.   David Chandler, the lead-
ing student of Cambodian history, has described in this way the 
population’s condition that obtained after the Khmer Rouge were 
driven from power by the Vietnamese:
 
 “Throughout 1979 and for most of 1980, hundreds of 
thousands of Cambodians crisscrossed the country look-
ing for relatives, returning to their homes…  [But] Villages 
had been abandoned or torn down; tools, seed, and ferti-
Fig.2 Yama sculpture located just outside of Vat Ounalom in Phnom Penh
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lizer were nonexistent, hundreds of thousands of people 
had emigrated or been killed; and in most areas the sur-
vivors suffered from malaria, shock or malnutrition.  So 
many men had died or disappeared in DK that in some 
districts more than 60% of the families were headed 
by widows.  Thousands of widows raised their families 
alone and with difficulty” [David Chandler 2007: 278-79].
     
Indeed, the immensity of the human carnage perpetrated upon 
Cambodia’s people, not just Khmer but especially minority ethnic 
groups, is very difficult to fathom.  What Chandler’s comments 
emphasize is the massive blow that was struck to the primary 
social institution of the nuclear family.  The sheer numbers of 
dead, estimated at 1.75 million out of a total population of 6 mil-
lion, indicate something of the family’s almost total devastation. 
Moreover, when it is recalled that the collectivization of agricul-
ture enforced by the Khmer Rouge resulted in the separation of 
nuclear family members, it becomes clear that the consequences 
of revamping Cambodia’s political economy comprised nothing 
short of a frontal attack on the institution of the family.  Indeed, 
the family had been suspected by Khmer rouge hardliners as be-
ing the chief rival institution vying for the fidelity expected uncon-
ditionally by the state [ankar].  Families were in shambles by the 
end of the socialist “experiment.”
While the Khmer comprise about 85% of the total Cambodian 
population and are overwhelmingly Theravada Buddhist in reli-
gious disposition, the bedrock indigenous religion that co-exists 
and is now interwoven with Buddhist practice is spirit and ances-
tor veneration.  Notwithstanding the protestations of elite educat-
ed Buddhist monks, Spirit and ancestor veneration permeates all 
levels of Khmer society.  It does not take much of an imagination 
to understand how the massive occurrence of death would have 
impacted such a population, especially since how and when most 
people died remained unknown to their family survivors.  The 
very basic question that must have been ubiquitous throughout 
Cambodia in the wake of the Khmer Rouge rule was this:  What 
has become of the spirits of all of these dead?  What has become 
of my father’s spirit?  My mother’s?  My grandparents’?  Did they 
suffer violent deaths?  Did they, very unlikely, receive a proper 
funeral?  How can we comfort them in their now dire conditions 
of sufferings?  How do we address them without answering these 
questions first?  That the dead would now be in conditions of suf-
fering would have been assumed by most Khmer Buddhists, given 
the popular and widespread Buddhist belief that the experience 
of violent death conditions the quality of ones’ immediate after-
life and rebirth.  To die violently in a frightful condition of suffering 
is, therefore, an awful fate to endure.  
In this context, it almost goes without saying why pchum ben 
has become so important in the “post Pol Pot era.”  Pchum Ben 
is a ritual that is primarily concerned with bringing the family to-
gether, at least once every year, to express solidarity and collec-
tive well-being, a well being that includes both the living and the 
dead.  And in Cambodia, as in so many other Asian cultures, refer-
ences to the family do not mean only the nuclear family, but the 
extended family as well.  Moreover, it has always been the case in 
Asian Buddhist cultures that the young people of the family have 
a duty to care for the old, to compensate, as it were, for the debt 
of being given life.  It is but an extension of that ethic that the liv-
ing meet their duties of caring ritually for the dead. The degree 
to which this ethic of care is now being emphasized in Cambo-
dia, as evidenced from the spectacular popularity now attached 
to pchum ben, would appear to be a direct consequence of the 
radical convulsions suffered by the social and political economy of 
Cambodia a generation earlier.  Pchum ben is nothing short of the 
family’s attempt, as well as society’s, to heal itself from the trau-
mas of loss, and in many cases to cope with the spiritual legacy of 
unknown and unaccounted for deaths.
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Fig. 3 Laity at Vat Kokos venerating their departed kin in front of a spirit shrine 
located on a surrounding walkway adjacent to the monastic sermon hall.  
Fig. 4 Spirits of the dead ritually returned to their abode via a ceremonial boat.
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Origins and Rise of the “Anglo-Chinese”
Caroline Sy Hau  
Associate Professor CSEAS
Over the past three decades, it has become chic to be “Chinese” or showcase one’s “Chinese” connections in 
Southeast Asia. Leaders ranging from president Corazon Co-
juangco Aquino of the Philippines, to King Bhumibol Adulya-
dej, prime minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand, and president 
Abdurahman Wahid of Indonesia have proclaimed their 
Chinese ancestry. Since 2000, Chinese New Year (Imlek) has 
been officially celebrated in Indonesia, after decades of le-
gal restrictions governing access to economic opportunities 
and Chinese-language education, use of Chinese names, 
and public observance of Chinese customs and ceremonies. 
Beyond elite and official pronouncements, popular culture 
has been instrumental in disseminating positive images of 
“Chinese” and “Chineseness,” as seen in Thailand’s Lod Lai 
Mangkorn (Through the Dragon Design, 1992), the Philip-
pines’ Mano Po (I Kiss Your Hand, 2002), Indonesia’s Gie 
(2005) and Malaysia’s Sepet (Slit-eyes, 2005). 
The term “re-sinicization” (or “resinification”) has been 
applied to the revival of hitherto devalued, occluded or re-
pressed “Chineseness,” and more generally to the phenom-
enon of increasing visibility, acceptability, and self-assert-
iveness of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. 
The phenomenon of “re-sinicization” marks a significant de-
parture from an era when “China” served as a model for the 
localization of socialism and propagation of socialist revo-
lution in parts of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and Southeast Asian “Chinese” were viewed and treated as 
economically dominant, culturally different, and politically 
disloyal Others whom nation-building discourse and policies 
sought to de-“sinicize.” 
The geopolitical, economic, and social conditions for 
this “Chinese” renaissance were laid down by a confluence 
of events: the US-China entente in the early 1970s and es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations between China and the 
countries belonging to America’s hub-and-spokes security 
system of “Free Asia” (which included communist-free Phil-
ippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia); rapid economic 
development that led to the creation of substantial middle 
classes in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, (and less success-
fully) the Philippines, as well as three of the four “Dragons” 
(Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore), within the context of 
Japan-led regionalization in East Asia in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s; the civil rights movement in America and the 
global circulations of mainly American-mediated intellec-
tual and institutional forms of multiculturalism and postco-
lonialism; the transformation of mainland China into a “so-
cialist market economy” in the 1990s; and, finally, China’s 
emergence as an economic powerhouse and a regional and 
global power in the past decade. 
For want of a better word, the term “re-sinicization” has 
served as an expedient signpost for the variegated manifes-
tations and revaluations of such Chineseness. Its use, how-
ever, does not simply affirm the conventional understanding 
of sinicization as a unilinear, unidirectional, and foreor-
dained process of “becoming Chinese” that radiates (or is 
expected to increasingly radiate) outward from mainland 
China. Since the “Sinosphere” (as Joshua Fogel calls it) was 
inhabited by different “Chinas” at different times in history, 
the process of modern “sinicization” cannot be analyzed in 
terms of a self-contained, autochthonous “China” (itself a 
term of foreign origin) or “Chinese” world, let alone “Chi-
nese” identity.  These “Chinas” were themselves products 
of hybridization and acculturation born of their intimate 
and sometimes contentious cultural, economic, and mili-
tary contacts with populations across their western, conti-
nental frontiers, most notably Mongols and Manchus, and 
with Southern Asia (India and Southeast Asia) across their 
southern frontiers. 
More crucially, the collision between China and the 
“West” in the late 19th century took place on a regional, 
maritime stage. The flows of people and modes of transmis-
sion of new ideas of politics and culture as well as new con-
ceptions of politics, culture, society, and community that 
entered and circulated in China from the west ran through 
pathways and networks created in the east. The making of 
“China” in the modern period is, for that reason, mediated 
Riri Reza’s bio-pic Gie is based on the life of Indonesian activist Soe Hok 
Gie.
Origins and Rise of the "Anglo-Chinese"
13
by two non-Chinese communicative spheres, Japanese and 
English (both British and American), which were created by 
the regional system in the east where British, Japanese and 
Americans competed for dominance. Its cultural matrix was 
one in which Japanese was an important linguistic mode of 
transmission of western concepts, while English served as 
the de facto regional and commercial lingua franca.  More 
than half of the total loan words in the Chinese language are 
from Japanese. An early political form taken by these “trans-
lingual practices” (to use a term by Lydia Liu) was Asianism, 
for which Tokyo/Yokohama served as the main hub, with 
smaller hubs in San Francisco, Singapore, Siam, and Hong 
Kong. Here, a kind of Sino-Japanese kanji/hanyü communi-
cative sphere helped create a network that linked, at differ-
ent times, personalities such as Kim Okgyun of Korea, Inukai 
Tsuyoshi and Miyazaki Toten of Japan, Sun-Yat-sen of China, 
and Phan Boi Chau of Vietnam. But it is also instructive to 
note that English became the second lingua franca of this 
Asianist network. It connected Suehiro Tetcho to Jose Rizal, 
and Sun Yat-sen and An Kyong-su to Mariano Ponce. 
In fact, along with his connections with Japan and Ko-
rea and Vietnam through the medium of written Chinese, 
Sun also exemplifies a specific kind of “modern Chinese” 
that first emerged in port cities such as Shanghai, Tientsin, 
Canton and Amoy as well as sites of Chinese immigration 
in Southeast Asia (Singapore, Java, Manila, Penang) and 
America. “Anglo-Chinese” (a phrase coined by Shiraishi Ta-
kashi) were part of the British formal and commercial em-
pire in the region.  In colonial Hong Kong and Southeast 
Asia, Anglo-Chinese—who, along with a smaller number of 
their Japanese counterparts, were often educated by Chris-
tian missionaries—staffed the bureaucracy and constituted 
the nascent middle classes of professionals (such as doc-
tors) and scions of Chinese merchants. Educated in both 
Chinese and English and sometimes only in English, and in-
terpellated as “Chinese” by the colonial policies of their re-
spective domiciles, these Anglo-Chinese were proficient in 
Cantonese, Hokkien, Cantonese, Malay, Javanese, Tagalog, 
and other local languages. Their multilingualism (and espe-
cially proficiency in the commercial regional lingua franca) 
gave them the cultural resources to move across social and 
linguistic hierarchies in their polyglot colonial societies and 
beyond.
These multicultural/hybrid Anglo-Chinese include the 
Straits-born Lim Boon Keng (1869-1957), a doctor by pro-
fession who was educated in Edinburgh. He was an asso-
ciate of Sun Yat-sen and later president of Xiamen (Amoy) 
University, and a key figure in the propagation of Confu-
cianism in Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. As 
Wang Gungwu has pointed out, Lim’s advocacy of Confu-
cian education was complemented by support for a modern 
curriculum that included the teaching of science.  Famously 
delivered in English at his presidential address at Xiamen 
University on October 3, 1926, his vision of revivified Con-
fucian teachings for the present time offered a distinctive 
platform for modernization in China. 
Sino-Japanese-English translingual practices had a wide-
spread impact on modern Chinese culture, politics, and mili-
tary organization. Their political impact is readily apparent 
in the crucial role they played in the introduction of socialist 
thought into China, via translation from Japanese. Ishikawa 
Yoshihiro’s study reveals that, between 1919 and 1921, thir-
teen out of eighteen Chinese translations of texts by Marx 
and Engels, and other Marxist figures—including The Com-
munist Manifesto—were based on Japanese translations. 
Writings by Japanese anarchists and Marxists such as Ko-
toku Shusui, Osugi Sakae and Kawakami Hajime also were 
read in China, Korea and Vietnam, and influenced the devel-
opment of socialism in these countries. Where political sur-
veillance of and crackdowns against Bolshevism restricted 
its transmission from Japan to China, Bolshevist thought, 
including its visual imagery, entered China via translations 
from English and especially America through the treaty port 
of Shanghai. Shanghai itself is a spatial representation of 
this Sino-Japanese-English hybridization. It was a port city 
where the British provided the policing and administration; 
the Japanese constituted the largest foreign contingent; and 
the gray zones created by the administratively segmented 
settlements enabled nationalists and communists from Asia 
and beyond to flourish, allowing figures such as Tan Malaka, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh), Hilaire Noulens, and Agnes 
Smedley to meet, mingle and organize their respective po-
litical projects in the name of the nation and international 
solidarity.
Beyond mainland China, the Sino-Japanese-English cul-
tural nexus was an enabling ground not only for the revo-
lutionary movement in the Philippines, but also for the 
political awakening of the Indies Chinese, whose activities 
would provide models and inspiration for Indonesian na-
tionalist activism. The first social and educational associa-
tion established in 1900, Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan taught not 
only Chinese but also English. Its teachers were recruited 
from Chinese students sent to study in Japan, and its text-
books, which were published in Japan and later Shanghai, 
had originally been designed for use by Chinese students in 
a Yokohama school run by a Yokohama Chinese; its opening 
had been graced by Sun Yat-sen and Inukai Tsuyoshi. The In-
donesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer would memorialize 
the Chinese influence on Indonesian nationalism through 
the revolutionary Khouw Ah Soe—a graduate of an English-
language high school in Shanghai. Although Soe does not 
Best-selling author and cultural entrepreneur Chitra Konuntakiet was 
educated in Thailand and America.
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publicly admit to it, he had in fact lived for some years in 
Japan and was sent from Japan to do political organizing 
among the Indies Chinese. In Anak Semua Bangsa (Child of 
All Nations, 1980), the protagonist Minke learns from Soe 
about anticolonial struggles in the Philippines and China. In 
a little over one generation, this political awakening and ed-
ucational trend would produce Anglo-Chinese Indonesians 
such as Njoo Cheong Seng (1902-62), whose popular Gagak-
lodra series of martial-arts fiction features the eponymous 
half-Chinese, half-Javanese protagonist, and who typified a 
new generation of Indonesian Chinese who were comfort-
able not only with Indonesian and Dutch but in particular 
with English. 
In the late 20th century, this form of hybridization be-
came a widespread phenomenon that reached beyond the 
elites and professionals and scions of rich merchants of the 
earlier period to encompass the growing middle classes and 
urban populations. 
It involves nationalization that incorporates elements 
and languages of Southeast Asia’s indigenous cultures. The 
product and agent of this process is the “Anglo-Chinese” 
(and, in the case of the Southeast Asian Chinese, “Anglo-
Chinese-Indonesian,” and so on). As mentioned above, 
the term “Anglo-Chinese” was originally applied to schools 
(sometimes run by western missionaries) where sons and 
later also daughters of ethnic-Chinese businessmen received 
the kind of education that prepared them for business and/
or professional careers. A version of the Confucian classics 
was taught in Chinese (Guoyü) alongside English and prac-
tical subjects such as accounting. “Hybrid” schools of such 
kind were established in the Nanyang territories (mainly in 
the British colonies of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya, 
but also in Indonesia and the Philippines), and in the port 
cities of Tientsin, Canton, Amoy, and Shanghai; some of 
their graduates went on to pursue higher education either 
in China or, more commonly, in England and America. 
A term that originated in the maritime-Asian world un-
der British hegemony can thus be fruitfully applied to the 
contemporary regional context of East Asian hybridization 
of Chinese, which is occurring at a time when, structurally, 
there is a tension between an East Asia regional security 
system based on a hubs-and-spokes system of treaties be-
tween America and its “allies,” and a triangular trade sys-
tem involving America, China, and the rest of East Asia. The 
crucial linguistic continuity from British to American English 
that accompanied the transition from British to American 
hegemony helped promote the use of English as a regional 
and commercial lingua franca in the postwar period. What 
followed was the widespread dissemination of Hollywood 
films, and, in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the 
Americanization of bureaucratic elites and professional 
middle-classes, and their worldviews in East Asia. Like their 
forefathers in this region the Anglo-Chinese are the kind of 
people who: are at least bilingual (with English as one of 
their major languages); received a western-style education 
(that normally includes secondary or tertiary or graduate 
education in America or Britain); have some grounding in 
the school systems in their respective countries and intend 
to educate their children in the same way; are well-versed in 
“international” (mainly Anglo-American) norms and values; 
and have relied on their hybrid skills (whether linguistic or 
cultural) and connections to go into business and work as 
professionals. One can also speak of comparable processes 
of Anglo-Japanization of Japanese, Anglo-Koreanization of 
Koreans, Anglo-Sinicization of Taiwanese, and comparable 
phenomena among segments of Southeast Asian middle 
and upper classes. 
Far removed from the context of anti-imperialist na-
tionalism that was the engine of sinicization in the first half 
of the twentieth century, “re-sinicization” is today more a 
component of, rather than an alternative to, ethnic Chinese 
Anglo-sinicization. Where earlier efforts at sinicization cen-
tered on activist and state projects on behalf of “China,” the 
process of becoming-“Chinese” is now primarily market-
driven, propelled as much by economic incentives for learn-
ing mandarin Chinese and seeking jobs in a rapidly growing 
China and East Asian region as by the desire to learn “Chi-
nese” culture in a more hospitable political environment. 
The mainland Chinese nation-state is an important, but by 
no means only, source of cultural identification and valida-
tion. The process of selective Anglo-hybridization involves 
not only ethnic Chinese (including those in the mainland), 
but non-Chinese Southeast Asian elites and middle classes. 
It prepares the ground for the creation of an encompassing 
and inclusive cultural frame of reference and communica-
tive meeting ground for interaction among the Southeast 
Asian middle and upper classes and between these classes 
and their counterparts in other areas of the world. Along 
with fellow Anglo-hybrid elites in their respective countries, 
Anglo-Chinese parlay their proficiency in local and regional 
languages as well as the global lingua franca and their famil-
iarity with Anglo-American norms and codes into cultural, 
social, and material capital. 
Contrary to the idea that mainland China is currently re-
making the region and the world in its image, parts of main-
land China—particularly its urban, middle- and upper-class 
populations in the coastal areas— may actually be undergo-
ing a form of Anglo-sinicization that makes specific groups 
and communities more like the modern hybrid “Anglo-Chi-
nese” that emerged, in the course of 150 years, out of the 
region we now call “East Asia” (which includes Northeast 
and Southeast Asia). These mainland Anglo-Chinese have 
more things in common—in terms of lifestyle, upbringing, 
education, mores and values—with urban, educated, mid-
dle-class “East Asians” than their rural and impoverished 
compatriots in China, East and Southeast Asia.
Origins and Rise of the "Anglo-Chinese "
Origins and Rise of the "AngloChinese "E
15
On January 18 2010, CSEAS welcomed Professor James Scott and other renowned Southeast Asianists to the 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University to par-
ticipate in an international workshop entitled “Radically En-
visioning a Different Southeast Asia: From a Non-State Per-
spective”. As one of the conveners of this seminar I would 
like to briefly introduce the overall theme and objectives.
The central question of this workshop was to ask to what 
extent can Southeast Asia be re-conceptualized, researched, 
and rewritten, if we considered non-state-centered perspec-
tives and as such all participants joined in a deliberative discus-
sion on these perspectives in the region and engaged in James 
Scott’s most recent work The Art of Not Being Governed (2010).
A cursory glance at ethnographies concerning social formations 
in the region highlights how the nation-state-centered perspec-
tive has long generated a discussion on center-periphery di-
chotomies. In Southeast Asia, it has been both in the symbolic 
domain of civilization and in the territoriality of the state where 
suppositions and questions have emerged in engaging what is 
the spatially uneven expansion of the power from the center. 
To take one example, the geo-ecological juxtaposition be-
tween hills and plains, has laid the basis for a social model re-
inforcing the stark differences between the two niches in terms 
of their political and economic status, agricultural mode, social 
mobility, the civilization’s worldview, religion, and kinship system. 
As such, in this conventional binary view on Southeast 
Asia, the upland tends to be seen as a fixed periphery vis-à-
vis river-mouth state formations. This dichotomous model is 
an archetypal case of lived essentialism in Southeast Asian 
scholarship and is regarded as problematic, as this simpli-
fying narrative neglects regional complementarity and dy-
namism which inevitably constrains scholarly analysis.
Not only have ethnographies been produced under the fixity 
of an upland-lowland binary, but also the history of Southeast 
Asia has been produced under statecraft inclination. In a sense, 
modern history was born and developed in the era of national-
ism within which the modern discipline of history arose. These 
have both served each other, marginalizing the peoples who pre-
dated the state or fell outside of its dominion. In other words, 
history has traced the lineage and legitimacy of modern states.
What needs asking here is whether a balanced ethnogra-
phy and history of Southeast Asia can be written, recognizing 
that before the 20th century the majority of its people lived 
outside the effective control of bureaucratic states. This is a 
crucial question to raise for a substantial number of people still 
live in uplands, border zones between nation-states, and mari-
time frontiers. Recent scholarship on Southeast Asia has sug-
gested that the state-centered view often fails to investigate 
the dynamic responses to the center by the periphery itself as 
well as active agencies on the ground. It is here where the un-
derstanding of upland-lowland interaction requires an alter-
native framework, which goes beyond a one-way diffusion of 
power, something this workshop has tried to tentatively address. 
This workshop arose out of an interest to engage in the at-
tention that scholars have begun to give to non-state centered 
perspectives over the past 10 years. These have included choice 
[Reid 1998], Zomia [Van Schendel 2001], hill-plain continu-
ums [Hayami 2004], Colonial arcs [Tagliacozzo 2005], Southeast 
Asian massif [Michaud 2000, 2006], non-state space [Scott 
2009] and border zones [Ishikawa 2010]. Among these new 
takes on the uplands of Southeast Asia, Professor James Scott’s 
recent work presents us with a point of no return: we all know 
that the innocent belief in the state’s magic power has some-
how been eroded and can no longer guide us as it once did. 
To engage in how the theoretical idea of Zomia plays out in 
Southeast Asia, our workshop explored different empirical case 
studies, with the aim of further refining and improving our under-
standing of Southeast Asian societies. The principle undertaking 
was to set out to correct the distortion imposed upon the past 
and present by re-reading the history of people without a history 
by critically examining state-centered historiography and ethno-
graphic works on non-state space such as borderland and maritime 
frontier. It is in this context that James Scott, the keynote speaker 
presents his thoughts on how this re-reading can critically allow 
us to explore new avenues in relations between various actors 
and tease out the nuances that exist in state and non-state spaces. 
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It has been a privilege to be with people who have found my book good to think with as well possibly think “against.” I am 
also proud to be treated as an honorary anthropologist here; this 
is important for me as I have been thrown out of my original polit-
ical tribe, the “political science tribe.” Therefore, I am orphaned. 
I am only too proud to be included in this tribe if anthropologists 
chose to adopt me. In this connection, I would like to offer some 
afterthoughts on my most recent work, The Art of Not Being Gov-
erned (2009).
In general, I feel that I should apologize for trading in binaries 
and dichotomies such as hill/valley when in fact there are foot-
hills and piedmont and other places in between state space and 
non-state space. I would like to suggest a few modifications of the 
following kind: instead of “state-space” and “non-state space,” 
we should possibly discuss places that have advantageous state 
potential, that is to say high state- or kingdom-building potential. 
If we use this term, we must be aware that it is not connected 
with altitude. As can be pointed out, in the Andes all the great 
states are at high altitudes. In the Americas, Peru can be taken as 
an example where all arable land was at elevations above 6,000 
feet. In the Andes, traditional states are midway up the hills with 
non-state peoples located in the valleys near the coast. So, every-
thing is more or less “upside down” in the Andes when compared 
with Southeast Asia. The key here is the existence of a sizeable 
alluvial plain, a place where intensive fixed cultivation is possible 
and therefore favoring a concentration of grain and people in one 
location. This is an important point to make as it also happens to 
be the case in parts of Zomia, where we find substantial alluvial 
plains in the hills. This is the case throughout much of the Shan 
Hills in eastern Burma, where large, potentially “state-making” al-
luvial plains, such as the one around Chaing Tung (Kengtung) may 
be found. States that have arisen in such hill areas have generally 
been connected with these alluvial plains at higher elevations. 
The areas of high potential for state making, in maritime South-
east Asia would often be located on the choke points of a river 
trading system or at a river estuary, strategic locations favoured 
by the small Malay states. These don’t have so much to do with 
concentrations of grain or population, but more with the capacity 
to control and monopolize trade and to tax it at a particular place. 
By contrast, we can also talk about places that are difficult to 
access and govern and have low state making potential, what we 
can describe as “state repelling places.” Many of these places are 
in rugged hills, however they need not be there nor even at high 
elevations. For example, in maritime Southeast Asia, swamps, 
marshes, mangrove coasts and deltas –which have accumulated 
vast amounts of silt over the past 400 years, are places that are, 
until relatively recently, difficult for states to access and often 
zones of refuge for people who want to maintain a certain dis-
tance from the state. Another point that merits mention is that 
the Southeast Asian state is seasonal. Historically, during the 
monsoon season the state shrunk to a smaller area than it could 
control during the dry season. As such, efforts to project state 
control into the countryside very much depended upon the dry 
season and came more or less to a halt in the rainy one. 
I should also plead guilty to the geographical determinism 
that is embedded in my argument. Arbitrarily, I declared that my 
analysis made no more sense after 1945. However I had reasons 
for choosing this date as the cut-off point in my book. I realize that 
this had unforeseen consequences, in that anthropologists who 
worked on the area around this time are no longer here to ques-
tion my decision! Yet, it seems to me that so massive changes in 
the range of state technologies governing movement and control, 
admittedly occurring at different speeds in different places, have 
made my argument difficult to extend beyond this point. 
First, we need to consider distance demolishing technolo-
gies. We have all-weather roads, railroads, steamboats, dynamite 
(to create navigable rivers that weren’t so before), earth moving 
machineries, chainsaws, telegraph, the telephone-- then the cell-
phone; and helicopters, military movement and military hard-
ware. These technologies make it possible for states to project 




themselves to the periphery; even the most inaccessible borders 
that they have been unable to control until now. In addition, 
although products were always brought from the periphery to 
the trading centres, they tended to be products of great value 
compared to their volume and weight, such as Bezoar stones, rhi-
noceros horns, camphor wood (Cinnamomum camphora), Gutta-
percha (Palaquium gutta) and so on. These valuable products 
were important sources of incomes in trading centres yet, what 
has happened since 1945, more in some places and less in others, 
is that the access to different kinds of economic products in the 
hills has become possible due to the new distance demolishing 
technologies. Examples of these are hydroelectric sites along the 
upper reaches of rivers, the extraction of previously inaccessible 
timber that can now be moved more successfully, mining in which 
it is possible to extract low grade ore, and of course plantations 
where the landscape of the hills is transformed by products that 
can be brought out by river or by truck via modern technologi-
cal means of transportation that were impossible before. Under 
mature capitalism, the hills have become a place of much more 
value for extractive purposes and the technologies now available 
allow for this to take place at a rate that was not possible before 
and to move products of relatively low value per unit, weight and 
volume over long distances. 
One of the most important changes we can see is the way 
in which the majority lowland populations have moved or have 
been moved into the hills by lowland states. Vietnam is one such 
example where there has been a campaign to do so, as well as 
the long Indonesian transmigrasi experiment to the outer islands. 
These forms of movement have been common in Thailand, Bur-
ma and north eastern India where we see lowland populations 
moving into the hills and a similar phenomenon can be observed 
in south west China with a Han population moving into the re-
gion. All of this movement points to a process that may be largely 
voluntary, yet it has a political objective. That objective is, to re-
place and perhaps, engulf a population that is considered to be 
less loyal, reliable or allegiant; a population of farmers judged 
more politically reliable that will grow cash crops while upholding 
state and lowland cultural values in the hills. This seems to be a 
huge difference and reminds us of something Peter Brosius once 
wrote about the Punan in Sarawak. He claimed that for them, 
they preferred the British to the Dutch as the British stayed at the 
mouth of the river and never ventured up river. This suggests that 
historically, states have stayed in the lowlands in the lower reach-
es of the river and it has been only very recently that they have 
been able to penetrate into the upper reaches of river systems. 
The last point concerns my discussion on state space and non-
state space: a dichotomy that is in most respects unsustainable, 
an issue which I have tried to address in the latter half of my book. 
I have tried to distinguish the reach of the state in different re-
spects, and when I focus narrowly on state space, what I intend to 
convey is the Weberian strong state exercising effective coercive 
control over concentrated populations and grain and the ability 
to tax that population through both manpower and the confisca-
tion of its grain. We can imagine a centre where the zone of direct 
administrative control would not be circular or mandala-shaped 
but rather ‘distorted’ to take into account land topography and 
waterways—that is to say, the relative ease of travel. 
The second aspect of the reach of the state that needs to 
highlighted, is the trade and exchange of products. Depending 
on how valuable the products are in terms of weight and volume, 
as well as the distances they can travel (the existence of the silk-
road is an example of this), we can note that hills and lowland 
centres have always been intimately connected in a symbiotic 
relationship of trade and exchange. Furthermore, this relation-
ship is one in which complimentary products were exchanged in 
different ecological zones. An example of this is the first tribute 
mission of the Thais’ to Beijing which essentially consisted of for-
est products collected by the Karen and then presented to the 
Thai Crown and deemed suitable for a tribute mission. This kind 
of movement suggests that the reach of the state as a centre for 
the in-gathering of products that enter international commerce 
and are consumed in the lowlands, resides in a much larger area. 
We can also state here that it is a zone that is outside the direct 
physical coercive control of the state. Exchange in this context, is 
essentially voluntary, where people who are engaging from the 
periphery, can withdraw if they like; where in the Malay world, 
actors can choose a different river system to deliver their goods 
and have a series of choices about where and with whom they 
trade. Here we should pause to emphasize that while the traders 
were free to trade or not, their “commodities” were frequently 
human captives. We must note that the most important prod-
uct traded from the hills to the valleys and traded in Malay com-
merce centres to non-state areas, were human beings—captives, 
In the above context, the third zone of state influence that 
merits consideration is the charisma of the state, as a symbolic 
entity with an imperial centre and its idea of kingship. Symbols 
weigh nothing and they transport easily (!) thus, we can argue 
that the symbolic reach of the state extends throughout the hills. 
Generally speaking there is no idea of power beyond local confed-
erations of villages in the hills that does not derive from lowland 
models of charisma and kingship. Wherever we look in the hills 
we see seals, charters, regalia, dress and paraphernalia that rep-
resent the symbolism of power and majesty, and of extra-village 
authority. This kind of symbolic reach of the state is extremely 
attractive, charismatic and links all of the highlands to the states. 
It is, however, symbolic power and not physical control.  
The last and by no means least interesting point is that of reli-
gious conversion. This conversion can seem to offer an alternative 
kind of modernity that differentiates the hills from lowland mod-
els of modernity. It offers a connection to a different kind of cha-
risma and lowland centre, and it is not insignificant that in many 
cases it offers a written script, a new kind of literacy that is not 
the same as the lowland script. One of the most important things 
in the hills, particularly through Christian missionaries, is a dis-
tinct script by which an oral language can be written, allowing for 
the creation of a literature that rivalled the lowland centres in the 
acquisition of literacy of texts. A book and script of one’s own! All 
of this points to the important ways in which hill peoples, know-
ing they are held to be in low-esteem by valley elites, aendeavour 
to rebalance relationships of dignity and cultural hierarchy. 
James C. Scott is Sterling Professor of Political Science, professor 
of anthropology, and co-director of the Agrarian Studies Program, 
Yale University, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. 
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On July 27, 2010, as many as 2,000 Cantonese-language speak-ers took to the streets of Guangzhou to protest the Chinese 
central government’s efforts to stop Cantonese-language televi-
sion broadcasts during the Asian Games. Apparently the govern-
ment wanted to spare visitors to the Games the inconvenience 
of hearing a Chinese language other than the official Mandarin. 
Interestingly, most of the protesters were young people who are 
also fluent speakers of Mandarin, having been schooled in that 
language and coming into adulthood in an age of Chinese eco-
nomic success at home and abroad. Despite the fact that more 
than 55.5 million people speak Cantonese globally, and the ex-
istence of a vibrant Cantonese cultural scene, the protesters felt 
enough of a threat to their cultural identity that they would risk 
the ire of the government at a high-profile time. The news of the 
Cantonese protesters reminded me of the importance of lan-
guage to peoples’ feelings of security, belonging and confidence, 
no matter how large a population of speakers the language has.
This story highlights the cascade of pressures from the glo-
bal to regional to national, and down to peoples’ daily lives. 
It also reflects concerns expressed by elders of the ethnic mi-
nority villages of northern Laos, where rapid and profound 
changes in economic livelihoods are under way. The constitu-
tion of Laos starts by asserting a multiethnic nation. But in the 
day-to-day business of implementing development policy, the 
tremendous ethno-linguistic diversity of the country is seen 
more as an obstacle to national progress. One striking char-
acteristic of Laos’ human diversity is the prevalence of small 
ethno-linguistic groups, speaking upwards of one hundred lan-
guages. Even the majority people speaking dialects of the Lao 
language comprise only 55 percent of the total population. 
Southeast Asia is an area of mega-diversity – both human and 
natural. On the mainland, five major language families – Sino-Ti-
betan, Austroasiatic, Tai-Kadai, Hmong-Mien and Austronesian 
– contribute to a view on high phylogenetic diversity, reflecting 
the distinct cultural origins and histories of their people. In the 
islands, the vast majority of languages belong to one large fam-
ily – Austronesian – which has spread across a staggeringly wide 
area of maritime geography. The historical processes of linguis-
tic divergence that created the linguistic diversity of the Indo-
Malayan archipelago has nevertheless maintained an important 
layer of shared cultural heritage among different ethnic groups. 
In both cases, dense networks of interaction have produced 
mutual influences within and across language families, further 
contributing to the complexity of the region’s linguistic mosaic. 
It is interesting to note that there is a high level of geo-
graphic correlation between linguistic diversity and biologi-
cal diversity at the global level. Demonstrating this with maps 
based on global databases was part of a larger effort bring-
ing together linguists, anthropologists and biologists that led 
to the formation of a research community defined by a com-
mon interest in what they termed biocultural diversity [Ma-
ffi 2005]. It is believed that 96 percent of the world’s lan-
guages are spoken by a mere 4 percent of the population, 
and much of this population lives in the tropics, where much 
of the world’s most bio-diverse areas are located as well. 
Of the more than 6,000 languages spoken in the world 
today, almost one third are found in East and Southeast Asia 
[Crystal 2000]. Globally it is estimated that languages are dis-
appearing at a rate of one every two weeks. Ethnologue, a 
frequently cited source on the world’s languages, estimates 
that there are currently 84 endangered languages in Asia 
[Ethnologue website 2010]. But this is probably a gross un-
derestimate. Only one language is listed for Laos, but within 
the area of my own work in northern Laos, there are at least 
four languages with just a few hundred speakers that may 
be lost within the lifetimes of my friends’ grandchildren. 
In Southeast Asia area studies, language is not a major 
framework for understanding the diversity and dynamism of 
society. Interest in language has largely focused on the role of 
language policy within the post-colonial nation-building project. 
The creation of Bahasa Indonesia and Filipino as national lan-
guages within newly independent states where hundreds of 
other languages are spoken exemplifies the type of atten-
tion that researches typically give to language. More recently, 
the current waves of globalization and regionalization have 
prompted some researchers to consider the pressures working 
on national languages and how these reflect national culture. 
The global-regional-national nexus is a conceptual space in 
which area studies researchers exert much of their intellectual 
efforts. It is within this limited space that most work on lan-
The Practice of Language: Linguistic Diversity and Multilingual-
ism in Southeast Asia
Fig. 1 A Pa San recites funeral rites for diseased community leader in 
northern Laos, using Pana language that has borrowed heavily from Chinese. 
Throughout the three days funeral Pana, Khmu and Lao were used freely by 
community members.
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guage has been done. This is surely an important framework of 
analysis that is highly relevant for understanding the past and 
present of the region’s diverse people, but it seems to overlook 
two of the main strengths of area studies conducted at CSEAS. 
First is the firm belief in the centrality of fieldwork and empirical 
foundations for analysis. Second, is the importance of using lo-
cal languages that is institutionalized in our work. If we are con-
cerned with the present and future of the region’s vast human 
diversity, the daily milieu of language use becomes a largely un-
explored area of investigation for Southeast Asia area studies. 
Given all the pressures on the linguistic diversity of Laos, 
one hypothesis would be that the Lao language, and perhaps 
Chinese, would assume new positions of dominance in socie-
ties, displacing smaller languages. However, observation of the 
interactions between social change and linguistic change can 
be extremely illuminating. For example, Bo Piet village, located 
10 km from the Chinese border, is an interesting and perhaps 
counter-intuitive case. The village was founded by the Pana, 
a small Tibeto-Burman group that abandoned shifting cultiva-
tion in favor of salt-production when they arrived in the area 
from China in the late 1800s. Subsequently, the Pana have been 
joined by families from other ethnic groups, such as Khmu, 
Hmong, Lue and more recently Phunoy. Interestingly, despite 
its weak social position vis-à-vis Lao, Chinese and other larger 
languages spoken in the area, Pana is spoken widely among 
the villagers, regardless of ethnicity. Intermarriage is common, 
and children of mixed parentage are being raised multilingual. 
The Pana are known locally as polyglots, and have been 
successful in maintaining their small language in an increas-
ingly cosmopolitan and multilingual environment. For them, 
using several languages over the course of a day is a part of 
daily life. At the same time, they enthusiastically explain how 
the ability to speak many languages is the main reason they 
have been able to navigate through a history migration, com-
petition for resources, and negotiation with more powerful 
people. Nevertheless, the children of the village will have more 
chances to get a Lao education, and more opportunity to en-
gage with the dynamic regional economy. The long-term viabil-
ity of Pana seems suspect, even as the language enjoys a po-
sition of surprising prestige, practical use and resilience in the 
village today. With just one other Pana-speaking village in Laos, 
which faces its own linguistic and cultural pressures from sur-
rounding groups, there is a fear that the Pana may disappear 
into the dust of national development and regional integration.
In fact, the Bo Piet case might not be as rare as it seems. 
Laos has embarked upon a development strategy that aims to 
relocate many mountain villages to roadsides, ostensibly in or-
der to increase access to government services and opportuni-
ties to shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture. After 
the upgrading of Route 3, a major highway running through 
Bo Piet village to connect the Chinese and Thai borders, vil-
lages started to gather along the road through a mixture of 
government relocation and spontaneous migration. The re-
sulting movement of people is bringing about a major spatial 
restructuring of Lao’s ethno-linguistic diversity. Previously it 
was easier (but still somewhat problematic) to identify a vil-
lage with one ethnic group, but now villages with three or 
more ethnic groups living together are increasingly common. 
The project’s social action plan, prepared in 2001 identified 
114 villages living along the stretch of 230km. At the time of 
the study, 16 ethnic groups were identified along the road. 
Twenty-five of the villages were recorded as being of mixed 
ethnicity.  Of the 14 villages I am familiar with along the road, 
all were classified as single ethnicity. Currently 12 of these 
are mixed, most with three or more ethnic groups. While this 
may be increasing proficiency in Lao and producing disturb-
ing breakdowns in community cohesion and cultural con-
fidence, it seems that new patterns of multilingualism are 
emerging as a first stage of establishing new social relations. 
As ‘good Zomians’, these people have typically maintained 
multilingual social settings that perplex the monolingual main-
stream. But research has not even begun to scratch the surface 
of the new social conditions created along these communica-
tion arteries. An excellent starting point is the language use 
of the local people and how it effects not only expressions of 
identity, but also raises other important questions about the 
creation of networks of information exchange, negotiation with 
the market, access of resources, distribution of wealth and 
inter-group power relations. Interestingly, James Matisoff, a 
linguist with unparalleled breadth and depth of experience in 
the linguistic landscapes of Southeast Asia, has stated that “ul-
timately, the answer to the problem of language extinction is 
multilingualism” [Gibbs 2002]. Multilingualism is the norm for 
the majority of the globe, and the same can be said for South-
east Asia. What can we learn from how people use languages 
in these new social settings of ‘development’, and what does 
this tell us about the role of language in society more broadly?
These are the questions I presented to the Hakuraku Coun-
cil last year at the interview with the Hakubi Project to Foster 
and Support Young Researchers. Since taking up my position at 
CSEAS in May, I have begun to implement a project to explore 
how the linguistic strategies of local people are reflected in the 
multilingual landscapes they live in. Ethnographic approaches 
to language use amidst rapid social change, such as that going 
on in the mountains of Laos, should open new windows onto 
other areas of interest in the Center as well. The warm welcome 
I have received has been an encouraging indicator of interest 
from a range of perspectives. In addition to the familiar area 
of the socio-economic aspects of livelihood transition in main-
land Southeast Asia (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) No. 
Fig. 2 Page from dictionary of Sino-Mun in Laos, giving pronunciation and 
meaning. The Mun are a Hmong-Mien group that use Classical Chinese writ-
ing for ritual and other purposes.
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22241058), I am broadening my own regional experience to ex-
plore multilingualism and the creation of social capital in riverine 
Borneo society under the framework of human-nature relations 
in high biomass society (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) 
No. 810104300001). Furthermore, the G-COE re-examination of 
global sustainability paradigms (Global COE Program In Search 
of Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa) has been 
a fertile area to begin discussing linguistic diversity as a view 
on the interface between the humanosphere and biosphere.
A disinterested observer may still doubt the importance of 
these language questions. What does it really matter if small 
languages follow the path of so many flora and fauna that have 
gone extinct, not to mention the countless languages that have 
disappeared over the millennia? Many scholars and activists 
concerned with the loss of languages are driven by the pro-
vocative assertion that “any reduction of language diversity 
diminishes the adaptational strength of our species because it 
lowers the pool of knowledge from which we can draw,” made 
not by a linguist, but a cultural anthropologist [Bernard 1992]. 
Drawing on a pool of shared knowledge also implies a cross-
fertilization of ideas. Thus stopping safely short of cultural and 
linguistic determinism, the question is one of networks of mu-
tual influence between culture, language and thought. Yet, only 
25 percent of the world’s countries recognize two or more of-
ficial languages. Even in places like Japan where monolingual-
ism has simultaneously been a source of pride and phobia, 
the need to manage, nurture and thrive in a multilingual so-
ciety has to become a key question for the new millennium.
This view stresses the need to see language not sim-
ply as a collection of tools for communication, but as a col-
lective embodiment of all human intellectual heritage. 
Framing language in such terms opens up myriad avenues of 
investigation for Southeast Asia area studies. To many, lin-
guistics is an impenetrable fortress of narrow investigation of 
the minutiae of languages. But the many sub-disciplines of 
linguistics – sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, anthropo-
logical linguistics, linguistic ecology and others – offer frame-
works and methods that can be of use to us non-linguists as 
well. Opening the door to language as an analytical frame-
work also challenges us to look beyond the specific lan-
guage we use in our field activities, to step back and see the 
languages we encounter in the field as a lens on society. 
Bringing the story back to northern Laos, my Pana teacher, 
a 26-year old male who works for a government office in the 
provincial headquarters, exemplifies many of the dilemmas 
that local people face in the management of multiple linguis-
tic repertoires. At first he was merely entertained by the idea 
of a Lao-speaking foreigner wanting to learn his language. 
Now, he clearly prefers to speak Pana when we are together 
in public. But what shapes his decisions about language use - 
a question of identity, strategy, or convenience? The answer 
is of course a combination of these. The ‘practice of language’ 
must also reflect the complex networks of social interaction, 
not to mention the multifaceted pressures from the layers of 
globalization and nation building, that converge on local set-
tings. The study of language cannot be separated from the 
daily lives and decision making processes of the people who 
speak them. Uncovering the motivations, interests and strate-
gies in language use at the most local level of daily practice will 
surely have application at other levels of analysis in the region 
and globally. In the end, it is the decisions that he, his friends 
and relatives make which will determine the fate of Pana. 
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“Taung-bon tetde” (climbing up the hill in Burmese) was a 
phrase I often came across during my frequent research vis-
its to Pa-an, the capital of Karen State in eastern Myanmar be-
tween 2004 and 2008. It referred to labor migration to Thai-
land across the eastern border hills. Up until the 1980s, the 
movement had been in the opposite direction, going westward 
to Yangon with migrants seeking opportunities in the old capi-
tal.  In 1988, Prime Minister Chatchai of Thailand declared the 
border areas to be transformed “from battlefield to market.” 
Since then, the border has become a hub of economic activi-
ties, bringing migrant laborers and goods both legal and illicit, in 
addition to refugees.  What is the nature of such border space, 
and how do the migrants cope in this in-between space?  This 
is a part of my on-going research on both sides of the border.
The Myanmar Side: Paan
In my research, I was pursuing religious practices centered around 
a cluster of pagodas in and around Paan, involving the Buddhist 
Pwo Karen population. Newly-wed couples visit the pagodas to 
make wedding vows on auspicious days according to the lunar 
calendar.  As many as one hundred couples visited one of the cen-
tral pagodas on the most auspicious days, which provided a won-
derful opportunity to conduct interviews.  Here, I found that 70% 
of the men and 60% of the women I interviewed (all together 40 
couples) had either experienced migrant labor in Thailand in the 
past, or had come to make vows to confirm a marital bond they 
had started during their sojourn in Thailand.  Many of the labor-
ers acquired one-year work permits, worked in factories, marine 
industries, construction, or as domestic workers. Some laborers 
stayed around Mae Sot, while the more ambitious moved on to 
Bangkok and further south. Wages were lower in the border zone 
such as Mae Sot where illegal laborers without permits could 
work for daily wages as low as 60 baht, or 3-4,000 monthly for 
those with permits, and higher in Bangkok and its vicinity, going 
up to a stable monthly 4,000 to 6,000. 
I was invited to a “wedding feast” held in a house near the 
pagoda. The 34-year-old “groom” who had just taken a vow at 
the pagoda had migrated to Thailand with his parents in his early 
childhood.  Now, both he and his father work in a factory in Tak 
(near Mae Sot), extending work permits every year.  He married a 
Thai woman five years ago and already had one child.  This time, 
he returned with his parents and child to make the wedding vow, 
and to visit his father’s mother, who had been tending their house. 
It was upon the strong recommendation of his grandmother and 
aunt that he came back for this ritual wedding vow.  His wife was 
terrified to cross the border, and refused to come with him, so 
instead he had brought a piece of her clothing to take along with 
him during the ritual vow.  Now that he has paid his ritual dues, it 
might be a long time before he ever comes back again. His father, 
on the other hand, hopes to come back after he makes enough 
money to rebuild his house and make sure he has enough savings 
for his life in old age.  The pagoda worship and wedding vows pro-
vided an important pretext for the migrants to come back. 
In the same neighborhood, I found a completely out-of-place 
house under construction—also the product of labor migration 
(Fig. 2).  There were only construction workers around, so I picked 
up some gossip, according to which, the owner couple were still 
working in Thailand to complete their house.  They remitted the 
construction fee, and sent orders for the house via their parents. 
The gossip was that it would cost a total of 5 billion Kyat.  The 
figure seemed even more outrageous than the building’s out-
Fig. 1 Dong dance performed by students of migrant children’s school in Mae 
Sot
Fig. 2 A migrant-laborer’s house under construction
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look, since it would take a hard-earning couple more than 25 
years to gain that amount even in Thailand. During a festival at 
the pagoda, a woman approached me, speaking in Thai.  She had 
been working in Thailand for 15 years and now owns a tiny hair-
salon shop near Saphaan Khwai in Bangkok.  She came back as 
her mother passed away, leaving her mentally disabled brother 
alone.  She planned to take her brother to a hospital in Bangkok, 
and then to come back and live with him in the village.
     Migrant labor is thus daily fare in the region, and the money 
saved was used in important family rituals, house construction, 
medical fees, and daily living of the family members left on the 
Myanmar side.  The migrants make use of the economic and 
other opportunities provided across the state boundary, and yet 
strangely for me, the sense I gained from these interviews and 
encounters was that the space beyond the boundary was imag-
ined more as continuous space, rather than as something beyond 
a tall boundary.  I thus decided to see how things looked from the 
other side of the border.
The Thai Side: Mae Sot
Since 2006, I started visiting Mae Sot on the Thai side, the first 
destination for most of the labor migrants from the Paan area. 
In 1992, the Thai government started issuing work permits to il-
legal migrants, to regularize their presence.  When the Thai gov-
ernment launched a campaign for registering laborers for work 
permits in 2001, there were 40000 registered in Mae Sot.  Even 
though at the time they had to pay 4500 baht for the process, 
it did not mean that labor conditions had improved for the mi-
grant laborers who took up 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and dif-
ficult) that Thais were no longer willing to take.  Often, the work 
permits were kept by the employers, immobilizing the workers. 
Some workers went on strike, but this was extremely risky, since 
it meant they would go on a black list and this could lead to an in-
crease in risks of unemployment and deportation.  While having 
work permits may not seem to be much of an advantage, illegal 
workers without permits are even worse off.  They may be paid as 
little as half to one-third of the standard local wage.
Some lived in Mae Sot town and worked in factories, resorts, 
and homes, while others lived in outlying villages as agricultural 
labor.  According to local common knowledge, in terms of health 
and educational facilities and the general standard of living, there 
is a hierarchy from the refugee camps at the better end, to illegal 
workers without work permits working in factories, and the illegal 
agricultural laborers at the lowest end.  Illegal non-permit work-
ers live constantly under fear of deportation, and their wages are 
extremely low, whether they work in farms or factories.  These 
are usually workers with small children who cannot risk moving 
to other areas, and prefer to have their children study at the mi-
grant laborer’s schools.  Yet, even this, they would say, is better 
than their life back home.
In the border areas, volunteer educational institutions called 
“learning centers” (schools outside the formal curriculum) are set 
up for the children of migrants, mostly with foreign aid.  Such 
“schools” had been founded since late 1980s, and in 1999, the 
Burmese Migrant Workers Education Committee was set up by 
an association of such schools.  At the time of interviews this as-
sociation covered 46 schools with 6,000 children and 300 teach-
ers. While the students, as children of migrant laborers, had no 
immigrant status, their school student pass provided them a form 
of identification, at least in Mae Sot and vicinity. Among such 
schools I found one run by Mahn Bala Sein, a Pwo Karen from 
Paan since 1990.  The more than 200 students were mostly Karen, 
and the languages used in teaching were Pwo and Sgaw Karen, 
Burmese, English, and Thai.  Many of the students were board-
ers, as their parents either worked elsewhere, or remained on 
the other side of the border sending only their children.  Life in 
Mae Sot, even without proper immigrant status, would be much 
better than being constantly under threat of harassment and/or 
recruitment by one of the ethnic armies in the border area on the 
Myanmar side. After finishing their studies, children go on to seek 
employment either with or without work-permit.
Mahn Bala Sein, along with other such schools with Karen 
students promoted the teaching of Karen cultural practices.  I 
happened to visit him at the time of the annual dong dance com-
petitions.  The dong dance is a distinct cultural feature in the 
Karen State and a well-known Karen cultural marker in Burma. It 
is performed at various State gatherings, Karen national events, 
as well as local events such as temple festivals.  Annual competi-
tions are held, and innumerable troupes participate from all over 
Karen State as well as from the border. Every year, the students 
at this Learning Center participate in the competition and go to 
dance at the Karen New Year festival, both of which take place 
on the Myanmar side of the border.  These Learning Centers are 
indeed in-between spaces, where the students study according 
to an officially unrecognized curriculum which hopefully prepares 
them to adapt to either side of the border while reaffirming their 
cultural ties.
What these vignettes from the field show is that  the border 
area constitutes an in-between and fluid space even though it is 
firmly within Thai territory so that the Thai authorities can move 
them out any time.  It is a game with no end, since the Thai em-
ployers cannot do without the migrants’ cheap labor, and the 
laborers are better off even in spite of the hardship.  It is a cat-
and-mouse chase where deportees expelled to Myawaddy just as 
soon turn back to Mae Sot.  In this in-between space, the laborers 
rely on social networks and cultural activities across the border, 
providing a fluid zone of contact.  We can also see that state con-
trol and citizenship are never a given but constantly under ne-
gotiation. As such, the everyday life of the migrants is founded 
on the continuity of social and cultural space.  Yet at the same 
time opportunities are different on the two sides thereby luring 
the laborers to cross the border.  How migrants make use of this 
continuity and difference in the fluid in-between space demands 
further analytical inquiry.
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In recent years, care for the ageing in Japan has become an area of intense concern for academics and the public. Huge 
questions loom, and the implications are significant – who will 
provide care, how can it be valorized, and what framework 
should it be organized in? With these issues taking the center 
stage of public and policy debate, academics have taken up a 
keen interest in the challenges of meeting Japan’s social welfare 
needs. Furthermore, this framework has been showing strong 
tendencies to mesh into a growing global economy for care. 
At present, a deficit of caregivers and home helpers has been 
leading to subtle, yet concrete transnational expressions of so-
cial relations as the ratification and implementation of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with both Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines have seen the introduction of foreign nurses. On the ra-
dar, this has taken place quite publically, yet domestically, another 
movement has run parallel to this: the creation of prefectural-lev-
el care-giver courses for long-term resident foreign nationals of 
whom Filipino nationals have been predominant. In this context, I 
want to briefly look at and introduce specific conjunctions that tie 
together two nations, Japan and the Philippines, and discuss how 
transnational relations are located within what I will call curoscape, 
a transnational sphere of administering and managing care at not 
just a local state level, but also a trans-regional and global one. The 
formation of this sphere is in part due to demographic and soci-
etal change in Japan which plays a role in changing the conceptu-
alizations of the capacity of migrant residents, leading to the reor-
ganization of relations within Southeast Asia and further beyond. 
Japan has undergone great demographic shifts leading to 
transformations in intergenerational relations within the na-
tion. As Japanese put off birth, and the present welfare system 
has extended life, internal changes have acted as a trigger to 
structure relations with surrounding nations. Japan’s present 
day social landscape is riddled with anxiety over the high stakes 
involved in care for a burgeoning aging and invalid population. 
Over 22.1% of the population is now over sixty-five1, and this 
population is projected to rise to 40.5% by 2055. In light of this 
present sobering prognosis, the health sector has seen a surge 
in demand for affective labor, of which there is currently a short-
fall. This is in part due to the fact that care-giver salaries and 
the status of care work are low in comparison to other occupa-
tions: even where there is a sense of satisfaction for care-givers 
in their work, many nevertheless quit due to the inadequacy of 
wages to support everyday life2.  These domestic changes have 
seen Japan realign its economy to express new relations with the 
Philippines, which in turn has strategically realigned its economy 
to supply workers for new emerging markets. Yet, to a certain 
degree this relation has resided upon producing an image of na-
tions and what they can supply. Furthermore, these images are 
feminized by the international commodification of the reproduc-
tive labor of care givers (predominately female) and their poten-
tial outsourcing to regions which require nurses or careworkers.
What factors have been involved in re-determining rela-
tions? In the case of both countries, one backdrop has been an 
ambivalent relationship over the past 30 years. Various errone-
ous articulations of images of Filipinas have ranged from those 
of mail-order bride to entertainer; from victims to gold-digger; 
and as a source of exoticism and otherness. External ‘third party’ 
influence has also been crucial in locating female others in Japan. 
Up until 2005, a steady flow of ‘entertainers’ from the Philippines 
had continued to enter Japan on short-term visas whereby the 
Japanese government under pressure from the U.S. reformed the 
Immigration and Control and Refugee Act. This led to a sudden 
sharp decrease of women (approx 42%) entering from the Phil-
ippines under the category of entertainer. This change also took 
place through advocacy for reform in the deployment of Filipino 
entertainers and pressure from the U.S. Department of State’s 
publication of its annual Trafficking in Persons Report which 
pointed out that Japan had yet to comply in improving the situa-
tion of persons trafficked to the country. However, this should not 
be seen as a foreclosure, for it operated as a form of gradual inter-
regional restructuring not only due to demographic transforma-
tion in Japan, but also macro-level processes between both coun-
tries, mainly the need to investigate the possible management 
and transfer of foreign workers. As such, in the public sphere, the 
shift from ‘entertainer’ to ‘carer’ came to be partly represented 
under the rubric of an EPA which in terms of human capital pro-
moted “the trans-border flow of goods, persons, services and 
capital between Japan and the Philippines3”  in the case of nurs-
es. However this change of focus framed in supposedly mutually 
beneficial terms has elided the foundations upon which the rela-
tions are built: labor export, the subsequent alienation of indi-
vidual members of families in one country and the reconfiguring 
of their global care potential directed for other overseas markets.
What needs to be made clear here is that we can see a pat-
tern whereby an export-orientated strategy rests on capitalizing 
on the notion of service in which the transfer – or in this case care 
1. Heisei 21 nen Koreishakai hakusho (White Paper on Ageing) Japanese 
Cabinet Office Policy on Ageing Society (2009)
2. As of 2007, the official monthly wage for care workers stood at 214.886 
yen ($2318) . This has subsequently increased to 231.366 yen ($2564) as of 
2010.  Heisei 21 nendo kaigo jujisha shogun joukyo nado chosa no kekka. 
Shakai hosho shingikai kaigo kyuufuhi bunkakai (2010).
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services-- leads to what the academic Lise Isaken has described 
as ‘externalized costs’ [2008]. These costs are the provisioning 
of fundamental ‘affective care’ for others but at the expense of 
developing it with close kin, family and children in home coun-
tries. This re-packaging of a relationship (from entertainment 
based services to care based services) is not however, purely 
the result of macro-level forces. The EPA acts as an interface 
between two nations, expressing a relation within a wider glo-
bal care chain expressed within a complicated curoscape where 
management and the administering of care for/by the nation 
takes place. But, it has done so alongside a movement within 
Japan that uses local Filipino residents as part of a litmus test. 
Research in late 2007 showed that nationwide there were 10 
courses which were targeting Filipino residents [Takahata 2009] 
In order to understand how a curoscape can operate it is worth 
understanding the concept of global care chains developed by Ar-
lie Horschild. Care chains is a concept that refers to the personal 
links developed between people across the globe in both paid 
and unpaid labor, particular affective and caring labor [Horschild 
2000]. This leads to not only displacement of individuals from 
families, but their very capacity to develop empathy-affecting 
relations with close kin as they tend to other’s kin. Care chains, 
have often described as the outsourcing of labor, yet it should 
also be understood as a form of in-sourcing. In Japan’s case, long-
term migrant residents with linguistic and affective social capital 
perceived to be readily available for care, can be seen as a form of 
in-sourcing. How Japanese actors who run courses or care homes 
re-orientate themselves vis-à-vis foreigners who provide care for 
elderly Japanese nationals needs to be understood as not just 
part of a local care chain, but also a regional one. Long term resi-
dents in such a context can come to bear a triple burden of caring 
for families in Japan, Japanese nationals in care homes and sup-
porting family members in the Philippines.These local (Japanese) 
actors also react to changing notions of care in their sphere of 
reciprocity and empathy-affecting relations transnational actors 
can bring with themselves. My own research with a local care 
giver course run exclusively for Filipino nationals suggests strong-
ly that actors (Japanese nationals providing training courses and 
care managers who employ them) high up in this hierarchical 
chain do recognize the flight of care from one intimate space to 
another, yet they genuinely desire to participate in their own un-
derstanding of what constitutes a ‘socio-emotional commons’.
The flow of transnational care sources, when grounded and 
re-imagined in new contexts, can suggest that in Japan’s case, 
previous encounters on the global arena, the rise of interna-
tional marriages through the presence of Filipinos in Japan from 
the early 80s, laid tentative groundwork. Actors ‘affect’, some-
thing that can be deployed as a service, has become a factor in 
re-orientating perceptions of and toward Filipinas and their sup-
posed latent capacity to be the ‘good carer’. To give an example 
of this perception as recently as 2008, one of Japan’s best sell-
ing tabloid magazines Shukan Post, carried an article on Filipi-
nos in Japan with the following title ‘whose hand are you going 
to hold when you depart?’ - Filipino hostesses attend the final 
moments’. The subtitle underneath continued, ‘words of grati-
tude continue for the Filipinas who commit themselves for less 
than 200 thousand yen a month’. In a corner of the article an 
undated photo from a previous decade shows four Filipinas, 
microphones in hand gazing into the camera from a stage with 
the caption underneath stating ‘one-time hostesses from the 
Filipina pub boom are now becoming helpers’. The article in the 
magazine then shows Filipinas dressed in nursing clothes work-
ing with the elderly in a home. The continuity here suggests is 
that it will be Filipinas who bear a shift which in name (as carers) 
does seem to offer new chances, but in form, is a repetition of 
offering a reworking of previous image of caring, gentle females. 
Now, as carers, female migrants are re-appraised through needs 
to respond to demographic change and offer care under a new 
mantle. This sets one perceptual backdrop in understanding how 
some foreign nationals in Japan are reoriented as a resource for 
procurement for caring for an elderly population. Previous rela-
tions inevitably inform new ones with a discursive reallocation 
of a new set of categories creating a new series of relationships. 
The ties between two nations suggests the deepening of 
an intimate and complicated relationship that will continue to 
evolve. Beyond Japan, improving lifestyles across the Asia-pacific 
region will undoubtedly see other nations mesh into a regional 
curoscape as careworkers and nurses circulate themselves, and 
their affective labor will potentially produce new configurations 
of care in the process. The flow of actors will need detailed re-
search to better understand micro-macro level relations evolving 
through specific nation-state interactions. And, the curoscape 
that I have suggested here also needs a more critical and detailed 
inquiry from multiple directions. To do so will allow us to bet-
ter define its dimensions especially when actors histories and 
conceptualizations form part of the political battleground over 
the care of ageing bodies within global capitalist production.
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I first visited Riau Province in early 1998 and it was immediately apparent that this province was not like other Indonesian prov-
inces I had visited. More than anywhere else, the hustle and bus-
tle of big business emerges all around. This was again confirmed 
two to three years later, when I strengthened my fieldwork ex-
perience by visiting other Indonesian provinces such as Jambi, 
South Sumatra, Lampung, and several provinces on Kalimantan. 
Compared to those provinces, Riau’s business environment was 
far more advanced, particularly in natural resources-related busi-
nesses.
Since then,  the question as to why Riau Province is so dif-
ferent to other provinces that on paper have similar conditions 
concerning their position within the Indonesian republic and their 
natural resources, has lingered in my mind. Neighboring provinces 
such as Jambi and West Sumatra for instance, lack a similar busi-
ness environment. At a symposium at Riau University in Novem-
ber 2010, I was asked exactly this question: why the difference? 
The logical answer I felt, was its geographic position close to one 
of the major trading hubs in Asia, namely Singapore, as well as 
the important fossil fuel mining businesses in the province, which 
have combined in not only opening the door to the province, but 
also putting it clearly on the map, and allowing it to grow faster 
than its neighbors in terms of (outside) investment and infrastruc-
ture. Though not verified in great detail, it is a hypothesis that 
seems highly plausible. 
In demographic data released by the Central Bureau of Sta-
tistics in 2010, the population growth of Riau Province topped all 
provinces in Indonesia in the 2005-10 period, with an average an-
nual growth rate of 4.11 % versus a national rate of 1.57%. This 
percentage is also quite striking because it is some 1.36% higher 
than the number recorded for the second province on the list, 
Central Kalimantan. However, this high growth rate did not come 
about until the early 1980s, growing from about 2.1 million in 
1980 to 5.4 million in 2010. This growth has primarily been gen-
erated by migration flows from neighboring provinces and Java.
It appears that in the last few years, Riau Province has become 
increasingly attractive for migrants. According to data released 
by the Provincial Government of Riau, migrant communities 
compose a large portion of the population in most districts. In 
2000, the migrant population aged 5 years or more was 44.7% of 
the district population on average. Most of these migrants were 
found to be Javanese (about 25%), while the rest were made up 
predominantly of ethnic Minang, Batak, Banjar and Chinese. It 
has been more than a decade since these numbers were record-
ed, and currently they are assumed to be much higher. 
The attraction of Riau Province for migrants cannot be sepa-
rated from the strong business vibe that can be felt there. This 
assumption was confirmed by several conversations I had within 
migrant communities. They prefer to move to Riau Province, be-
cause they hear from other migrants going before them that it 
is easy to make money and start a new life there. But is it true 
that it is indeed easier to make money in Riau Province and start 
a new life there? From my field studies thus far, it appears that 
this assumption can be said to be true for about three out of four 
people. Most of the migrants coming to Riau are either young 
adults that have just started a family and see few good options for 
building a long-term future in their place of origin, or people who 
have for some reason fallen on hard times in their place of origin 
and seek a new beginning. 
The two types of migration flowing into Riau Province are 
that of government-sponsored migration (commonly known as 
“transmigration”) and self-initiated or spontaneous migration. 
Government-sponsored migration is most often associated with 
the development of oil palm plantations, industrial timber plan-
tations or rice production. Meanwhile, spontaneous migration is 
most commonly associated with a search for agricultural land or 
labor work. 
The flow of migrants to Riau Province cannot be seen separate 
from the various commodity development schemes that have 
been implemented in the province. Initial development is linked 
to the beginning of oil exploitation in Riau Province around 1936, 
when the colonial government began issuing concessionary rights 
for petroleum drilling in Minas. At that time, only South Sumatra 
had seen similar developments. At present, Riau Province is the 
largest contributor to national fossil fuel production in Indonesia.
In the records of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resourc-
es of Indonesia over 2010, Riau province accounts for more than 
46% of national oil production, or an average daily production of 
380,807 barrels. However, the relatively limited number of lab-
orers involved in the industry does not allow for it to absorb a 
substantial part of the newly arrived migrants into the province. 
Indirectly on the other hand, the influx of oil money greatly sup-
ports the region’s rapid economic growth. High revenues for the 
provincial government for instance, allow for a more rapid devel-
Smallholders transporting their harvest to a nearby crude palm oil mill
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opment of infrastructure and other facilities. This effect has been 
even greater after Indonesia implemented a policy for increased 
regional autonomy in the late 1990s, resulting in a greater stream 
of revenue from the oil production staying in Riau Province rather 
than flowing to the national government in Jakarta. 
     In the forestry sector, a massive exploitation of forest wood 
began around 1975, when the Indonesian government began is-
suing large-scale logging concessions. In 2000, 77 logging compa-
nies were active in  extracting timber from the province’s natural 
forest. Supporting these logging companies, there were some 
312 related plants or facilities, such as sawmills, plywood mills, 
and chip mills. At that time, roundwood production in Riau Prov-
ince was also considerable, until the early 2000s it contributed to 
around 35% of the national roundwood production tally. These 
combined industries not only accommodated the arrival of mi-
grant labor into Riau Province, they also opened up previously 
isolated areas by constructing a web of logging roads through the 
province, allowing for new settlements inside the forested areas 
to appear. 
This role of the forestry industry in attracting migrants from 
outside the province became more formal when the government 
introduced programs combining forest plantation development 
and transmigration. These began to bloom in the early 1990s. For 
the year 2002 for example, the Ministry of Manpower and Trans-
migration recorded 6 projects that combined the development of 
forest plantation companies with transmigration projects involv-
ing some 2,250 households. 
Another type of commodity development that has signifi-
cantly influenced the flow of migrants into Riau Province is the 
palm oil industry, starting in the early 1980’s. Since then,  devel-
opment of  oil palm plantations has been very fast, from about 
2000 hectares in the 1980s to over 2.3 million in 2010. This large 
number  shows that oil palm plantations are responsible for more 
than 26% of land use in the province. Half of these plantations are 
managed by smallholders, while the rest are under management 
of companies or investors. This massive level of crude palm oil or 
CPO production has made Riau Province one of the major play-
ers in the world market for palm oil. In the year 2010, the Riau 
Government claimed that the province produced 7 million tons of 
CPO, equal to almost 12% of total world production. 
In this context the widely publicized global demand for palm 
oil has attracted investors both large and small, as well as small-
holders and migrants, to take part in this industry. Various gov-
ernment policies are also in place to boost the development of 
the palm oil industry, pushing it to become the principle industry 
over the province in the last few years. Incentives include infra-
structural improvements, such as roads and harbors, and provi-
sions allowing for a so-called tax holiday for investors.
To support its industry, Indonesia has developed a special 
system for managing oil palm plantations involving smallholders, 
known as PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat/Nucleus Estate Smallhold-
ers). It is a production system that combines an estate plantation 
(nucleus) managed by big investors with smallholder plantations 
managed by local communities, and it has become a common ve-
hicle for migrants to settle in Riau Province. In 2007, the Office of 
the Governor of Riau stated that PIR Plantations in the province 
covered 901,276 hectares, with 555,543 hectares being owned 
by the estate plantations and the rests by smallholders represent-
ing some 172,866 households. 
Visiting Riau Province you cannot help but be overwhelmed 
by the images set forth by the sea of oil palms. They have spurred 
growth and migration, and will likely continue to do so as long 
as the industry keeps promising lucrative profits and livelihood 
security for its smallholders. Considering the provincial mini-
mum wage in Riau Province stands at IDR 1.2 million a month, 
the eagerness for people to get involved in the industry is under-
standable: at the current market price, even a 2 hectares oil palm 
plantation (2 hectares being the smallest unit a smallholder can 
obtain through the government-sponsored programs) can earn 
a household on average between IDR 2 and 3 millions a month
Naturally questions can be raised on whether this seemingly 
unbridled growth and opportunity in Riau Province can persist. 
Pressures on natural resources have always been high in the 
province, but as land availability and land quality are diminishing, 
will the province continue to be able to absorb the continuing 
migration of people looking for a better future? 
With the long-term prospects of the oil industry in Riau Prov-
ince and Indonesia as a whole in question due to diminishing 
supplies and lack of investment, the traditional backbone of the 
Province’s wealth is clearly under threat. This raises the question 
of whether the lucrative natural resource based industries that 
are now surpassing it, most notably the oil palm industry, can 
provide sufficient impetus for the province to fully adapt to its 
changing reality. With rotation times of the nutrient-hungry oil 
palm plantations at about 25 years, there is no real experience 
with the consequences on soil quality and future production lev-
els of implementing a second rotation at the current large scale. 
These leaves us with worrying questions about future viability. 
Thus, it is apparent that the current economic model in Riau 
Province will have to undergo vast change, and in its wake so will 
the social and industrial premise of its society. How the province 
will address these issues in a time of relative boom is of great sig-
nificance to its future prosperity. If opportunities in the province 
dry up, the continued influx of highly motivated migrants may be-
come little more than an additional nail in it’s coffin, but if new 
opportunities are sensibly developed, these same migrants may 
form the basis for a truly interesting experiment in change, devel-
opment and sustainability in Indonesia. Either way, Riau Province 
will be among the first to experience first hand.
Acacia timber on its way to a pulp and paper mill
For Better or for Worse
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CSEAS is accepting applicants semiannually for about 14 po-sitions for scholars and researchers who work on Southeast 
Asia, or any one of the countries in that region, to spend 3 to 
12 months in Kyoto to conduct research, write, or pursue other 
scholarly activities in connection with their field of study. Since 
1963, more than 200 distinguished scholars have availed them-
selves of the Center’s considerable scholarly resources and 
enjoyed the invigorating atmosphere of scenic Kyoto, the an-
cient capital of Japan and the main repository of the country’s 
cultural treasures, to pursue their interests in Southeast Asian 
area studies. The Center’s multi-disciplinary character and the 
diverse research interests of its faculty offer visiting scholars an 
ideal opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the cultivation 
of comparative perspectives.The highly competitive selection 
process has brought to the Center in recent years researchers 
form Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Korea, and 
western countries including the United States and France. The 
visiting fellows represent various basic disciplines in their study 
of Southeast Asia, and their official posts in their home institu-
tions include teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, and NGO 
worker. Information and Technology (IT) experts who conduct 
research on Southeast Asia are also joining the Center, not only 
to manage various database systems but also to construct aca-
demic networks for area study throughout the world. Success-
ful applicants receive an appropriate stipend to cover interna-
tional travel, housing, and living expenses in Kyoto. Research 
funds will also be provided to facilitate his/her work. Funds will 
also be allocated for domestic travel, subject to government 
regulations, and a number of other facilities are available to 
visiting scholars. Fellows will be expected to reside in Kyoto for 
the duration of their fellowship period. Fellows are normally in-
vited to deliver a public lecture during their term at the Center 
and encouraged to submit an article for possible publication 
in the Center’s quarterly journal, Southeast Asian Studies and 
to contribute to the online journal Kyoto Review of Southeast 
Asia . CSEAS also received researchers, both Japanese and for-




Published since 1963, this peer-reviewed journal carries the results of important re-
search on Southeast Asia by scholars from Kyoto University and other institutions. The 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies accepts submissions all year round that contribute 
to the development of Southeast Asian Studies. Access to the journal is free. 
For more information please contact the editorial office, or visit our editorial office 
homepage. 
http://www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/edit/publications/seas/index_en.htm
Transborder Governance of Forests, Rivers and Seas
Wil de Jong, Denyse Snelder and Noboru Ishikawa, eds. 2010. Earthscan.
This book illustrates the diversity of transborder natural resources, the pressures that 
they experience and the opportunities for monitoring and enforcement through mul-
tinational regulatory regimes. It presents ten cases of transborder natural resources 
that are of interest to two or more neighbouring countries, and that are subject to or 
in need of bilateral or multinational coordination. The cases include the exploitation 
of marine resources in international waters, rivers travelling through several countries 
and contiguous tropical forests across national borders, and where commodities, na-
ture conservation or even territorial integrity are at stake. They are drawn from across 
the globe, including flood management in Western Europe, tropical forests demarca-
tion and conservation in the Western Amazon and Central Africa, hydropower devel-
opment in the Mekong region of South-east Asia, and marine resource and fisheries 
exploitation in the waters of Japan, South-east Asia and Australia.
Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) No. 22
Living with the Risks: Risk Responses of the Lower-classes in Bangkok
『都市を生きる人々――バンコク・都市下層民のリスク対応』
Tamaki Endo, 2011. Kyoto University Press.
In the era of globalization, uncertainty and insecurity is increasing. This book analyzes 
risk managing process of urban lower-class by focusing on two dimensions: residence 
and occupation. What is role of “individual,” “household,” “community” and “society” 
in the risk management process? What are the “successes” and upward mobility of the 
urban lower-class? What do the dynamics of the Informal Economy mean for the city? 
This inspiring volume cuts in the core of disparity issues, taking advantage of a combi-
nation of multi-disciplinary framework and diligent fieldwork. It succeeds in depicting 
people’s survival in the wake of diverse risks in Bangkok.  
Award
The Vietnamese version of Farming with Fire and Water: The Human Ecology of a Com-
posite Swiddening Community in Vietnam’s Northern Mountains, edited by Tran Duc 
Vien, A. Terry Rambo, and Nguyen Thanh Lam, received the silver (second) prize in the 




The Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University was established in 1963 and has led the way in 
conducting detailed and empirically valuable studies across 
a broad multidisciplinary field. Since its inception, research-
ers from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds have devoted 
themselves to the investigation of Southeast Asia within a 
multidisciplinary framework. 
During a period of constant dramatic political realign-
ment and global economic integration within and across 
the region, CSEAS has consistently dealt with the need to 
address diverse research agendas and deepen knowledge 
in changing times brought about by fresh challenges. As a 
center of excellence in Area Studies, CSEAS has promoted 
its commitment to its field through a solid history of publi-
cation activities that stretches back to the 1960s. At present 
CSEAS publishes five series which each aim to present origi-
nal cutting edge academic research which contributes to the 
further development of Southeast Asian Studies. 
The first monograph series was started in 1966 in con-
junction with Hawaii University Press, and manuscripts 
were initially authored exclusively by faculty. However, since 
2000 the series has been opened up to outside contributors 
both within and beyond Japan. This series has  focused on 
topics such as tropical forests, rice production, paddy field 
cultivation and so on. The other series, Kyoto Area Stud-
ies on Asia (English) jointly published by Trans Pacific Press 
and Kyoto University Press, has also allowed researchers to 
demonstrate the depth of their commitment to Southeast 
Asian Studies and share their rigorous empirical results. 
Most recent titles in this series have dealt with timely top-
ics such as the impact of agrarian development programs 
on rural class structure in Bangladesh; the discourse of adat 
landownership that played an important role in peasant re-
sistance against Indonesia’s state development programs; a 
15 year research project of composite swiddening in Viet-
nam’s northern mountains; a comparative analysis of mid-
dle classes in Southeast Asia; and an analysis of the ways in 
which East Asia has grappled with ongoing regional integra-
tion of economies in the area. In 2009, CSEAS also started a 
new English language series in collaboration between Kyoto 
University Press and National University of Singapore Press. 
This series was created to deal with the increasing demand 
for effective outlets of scholarship on Asian Studies by Asian 
scholars. This series has been set up as a new step toward 
securing paths for scholars both within and outside Japan, 
to showcase high quality Asian Scholarship and appeal to a 
wider audience. 
Aside from the English language series, CSEAS also pub-
lishes in Japanese. The first series in Japanese was the Kyoto 
Area Studies on Asia (Chiiki Kenkyu Sosho). This was super-
seded by a new series started in 1999 to showcase Japanese 
scholars work through the Kyoto University Press. 
Recent publications include a detailed study of the ef-
fects of modernization upon nature and environment under 
the Javanese colonial government in the first quarter of the 
19th century; a rich analysis of state-military relationships 
and the power structure of military Burma; religious prac-
tices in the peripheries of  mainland Southeast Asia; the 
formation of multi-ethnicity in Southeast Asia within the 
framework of modernization and colonization; and an em-
pirically rich ethnography that analyses the emergence of 
national space through fieldwork conducted on the border-
lands between Malaysian Sarawak and Indonesian Borneo. 
What all of these series aim to do is place the importance of 
empirical fieldwork, its write-up and presentation to both 
a specialized and multi-disciplinary academic audience. To 
process publications CSEAS has a dedicated publications 
committee composed of faculty members of varied discipli-
nary background which accepts manuscripts all year round. 
These are carefully checked and then sent out to academic 
specialists who peer review all submissions. This is done to 
assure the high quality of all manuscripts that make each 
series. 
CSEAS also produces a quarterly journal Southeast Asian 
Studies (SEAS) which has been published continuously since 
1963. SEAS is bilingual, and reflects the CSEAS principle of 
fieldwork based, multidisciplinary, and contemporary ap-
proaches toward research and publishes work from vari-
ous fields of study on Southeast Asia including the natural 
sciences, social sciences and humanities. Peer reviewed by 
a broad range of specialists, the center accepts articles for 
review all year round. 
Finally, CSEAS has also recently launched “International 
Program of Collaborative Research, CSEAS [IPCR-CSEAS] as 
one of the Japanese Ministry of Education’s Joint Use/Re-
search Centers. One of the IRCR-CSEAS objectives is to aim 
at publishing world class academic journals and monographs 
and offers a grant for supporting publications aimed at an 
international audience. At present two titles are in prepa-
ration for publication in 2011. CSEAS is constantly looking 
for new opportunities to expand its publishing activities and 
hopes to play a central role in developing new questions and 
paradigms for the 21st century by bringing Southeast Asian 
Studies to a broader audience over the coming years. 
For authors with any potential manuscripts for Southeast 
Asian Studies or for our book series please contact the Edi-
torial Office for more information. 
editorial@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp 
Publications at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies
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CSEAS deeply mourns the untimely passing of Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia founding editor Donna J. Amoroso on 
January 22, 2011.  She was fifty years old.
In her years at the Center, Dr. Amoroso was instrumental in 
planning, launching and editing the multilingual online journal, 
the first of its kind to showcase review articles, commentaries, 
and features by Southeast Asia specialists and public intellec-
tuals in English, Japanese, Thai, Filipino, and Bahasa Indonesia 
(with Chinese as the most recent addition).  
She was a first-class editor who helped bring out the best in 
other scholars in the Center by working with them to produce 
English-language articles and books that were not only lucid 
and substantive, but also well-written.  
But she was also a scholar in her own right. She wrote her 
doctoral dissertation in Southeast Asian History from Cornell 
University on “Traditionalism and the Ascendancy of the Ma-
lay Ruling Class in Colonial Malaya,” and published thoughtful 
articles on colonialism and nationalism in Southeast Asia, on 
Malay historiography, and on comparative politics in Malaysia 
and the Philippines.  With Patricio Abinales, she co-authored 
State and Society in the Philippines (Rowan and Littlefiled), a 
Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2006 that provided a 
new perspective with which to understand Philippine history 
and current events. 
Not just editor and scholar, Donna was friend and col-
league to many people in the Center. For visiting researchers 
from Southeast Asia and elsewhere, she provided warm hospi-
tality and intellectual camaraderie. For students, she provided 
friendship and much-needed advice on scholarly and per-
sonal matters. For colleagues, she was the moving force be-
hind KRSEA and many other publications that showcased the 
Center and its activities. For those of us who are privileged to 
have gotten to know her over the years, she was witty, sharp, 
broad-minded, widely read, an excellent cook, a loving wife 
and mother, a good friend, a companion of the heart. We shall 
greatly miss her.    
  Do not stand at my grave and weep
  I am not there; I do not sleep.
  I am a thousand winds that blow,
  I am the diamond glints on snow,
  I am the sun on ripened grain,
  I am the gentle autumn rain.
  When you awaken in the morning’s hush
  I am the swift uplifting rush
  Of quiet birds in circled flight. 
  I am the soft stars that shine at night. 
  Do not stand at my grave and cry, 
  I am not there; I did not die.
    -Mary Frye, date unknown
In Memorium: Donna J. Amoroso 
1961-2011
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Donna and I were introduced to each other long before we met in person.  Her husband, Jojo Abinales,  a long time friend 
and associate in doing Mindanao studies,  had already mentioned 
her to me several times.   I knew that Jojo was quite fortunate to 
have met his match – in intellectual pursuits, in music, in art, and 
in films.  Meeting her, and staying with them in their home in 
Tokyo and in Yokohama was for me a distinct privilege of having 
been  close to and on personal terms with two great scholars, as 
far as Philippine, Malaysian and Southeast Asian studies are con-
cerned.  Everyday interaction in the Donna-Jojo household was 
always a delightful intellectual exercise, sparked most of the time 
with Donna’s smart remarks as counterfoil to Jojo’s verbal antics. 
But it was Donna’s  gentle but firm maternal ways that re-
ally struck me.  As a mother myself, I could relate to Donna’s oft-
repeated concerns about raising a headstrong daughter:  trying 
to find the “best” ways for disciplining without being too harsh, 
balancing love with firm grips on constant and consistent “rules 
of engagement.”  We shared all these concerns over our break-
fast coffee in Yokohama, or when we were cooking some Filipino 
vegetable dishes, like pinakbet (stir fried assorted tropical vege-
tables, traditionally cooked in fish sauce) and adobong kangkong, 
(stir-fried leafy vegetables, cooked in a combination of vinegar 
and soy sauce) which she relished so much.  
Like the scholar that she was, she always brought a pen and 
a notebook in front of the stove and recorded all the things I did 
to cook a certain dish.  She said she wanted to know in detail the 
“secrets” of my cooking so she could replicate the taste of the 
dish when she cooks it!  But it was not only in cooking where she 
showed her scholarly attitude.  With a special maternal pride, she 
showed me her small books about Angela after she and Jojo first 
got her:  Angela’s first English words, which later on proved to be 
unwieldy because of the speed of Angela’s progress in speaking 
English; Angela’s many “firsts” .  All these she recorded painstak-
ingly, in handwriting, in different small notebooks.  
In late 2008, Donna was diagnosed to have Stage 1 breast 
cancer (this was in Japan, but actually it was Stage 3 already, ac-
cording to her doctor in the US).  It came as a shock to me, since 
at that time I was just recovering from grieving over the death of 
my only brother – also to another type of cancer- that of the liver. 
My brother was only 48 when he died, and Donna was also of the 
same age at that time.  She immediately asked me, “Maybe I will 
go too, at this age?”  I argued that my brother had an unhealthy 
lifestyle since he was a teenager and his cancer was discovered 
when it was at its terminal stage, when there was no turning 
back.  I told her in the most reassuring way that I could, that she 
was far healthier than my brother was, and except for the cancer, 
she was otherwise a very healthy person.  She could very well lick 
it, like all other women cancer survivors I know, I told her.  
With my stay in Japan about to end, I had to bid goodbye 
to Jojo, Donna and Angela, in January 2009.  Little did I expect 
that it would be my last physical interaction with Donna, whom 
I have considered not only as a friend, but also a part of my ex-
tended family.  Despite the distance, Jojo, Donna and I continued 
our interaction through e-mail, and Jojo once visited my home in 
Mindanao early last year.  Jojo had shared that Donna was fast 
recovering through a combination of chemotherapy and radia-
tion treatments, and he never indicated any possibility of relapse. 
When Donna knew I would be a paper presenter in the forthcom-
ing AAAS conference in Honolulu this March, she immediately 
wrote to invite me to go to Washington DC to visit them there.  
So it was a tremendous shock to me when I got news of Donna’s 
passing.  It was even sadder to note that it was not cancer that 
got her, it was something unexplainable – like a lighted candle 
burning the last part of its wick, or a power switch turned off.  It 
was like her life force was just gently removed from her body. 
Looking back, it was typical of her:  to go quietly, gently into the 
night, without much ado, but with light shining bright, like the 
“soft stars that shine...”
Donna will forever be etched in many people’s hearts, includ-
ing mine, and I am fortunate to have been touched, albeit briefly, 
by Donna’s sincerity, honesty, sweetness and gentle ways.  Deep 
friendship is not measured by the number of years as friends – I 
think it is the quality of interaction that defines one’s kinship with 
another person.  And I am lucky to have enjoyed that with Donna. 
Farewell, Donna...you will forever be missed...But I will always re-
member you are still around, in the rain, in the gentle wind, in the 
soft stars that I see at night, wherever I am...
Kyoto, January 29, 2011
Remembering Donna 
Rufa Cagoco-Guiam
Visiting Research Fellow CSEAS
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